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paradigm as a lens for viewing politics understood in more conventional terms, it provides a way of analysing to what extent the two
tendencies are identifiable in politics.
Finally, this study returns to the core of political research by analysing the liberal representative government from the viewpoint of
the dance paradigm. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the means aspect of politics coincides with a so called elitist view on democracy as
presented for instance by Joseph Schumpeter. If elections are viewed as a moment of competition for votes, they can be described
as a typical form of improvisation with a minimal restraint. On the other hand, this minimally restrained space has been invaded by
parties and pressure groups that resemble strict forms of choreographies.
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Tutkielman lähtökohtana on tanssin kytkös politiikkaan. Perinteisesti tanssia ja muita taiteita on politiikan tutkimuksen yhteydessä
käsitelty politiikan kannalta marginaalisina tai täydentävinä ilmiöinä. Näissä tutkimuksissa politiikka ja tanssi mielletään selvästi
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poliittisissa kampanjoissa. Tässä tutkimuksessa lähdetään liikkeelle päinvastaisesta asetelmasta; tanssi itsessään tuodaan politiikan
keskiöön ja tarkastellaan sen näkökulmasta avautuvaa käsitystä politiikasta. Näin muodostetaan tanssista politiikan keskeinen
paradigma. Teoreettisena lähtökohtana on Hannah Arendtin käsitys politiikasta praxiksen tilana, joka avautuu ihmisten välille
toiminnan kautta. Lisäksi tätä prosessikäsitystä politiikasta tarkennetaan Giorgio Agambenin, Jean-Luc Nancyn ja Alain Badioun
ajattelun kautta.
Tutkielma on olemukseltaan varsin teoreettinen, mutta kuitenkin vahvasti kytköksissä empiiriseen materiaaliin. Tanssiparadigman
konstruktiossa käytetään valottavana tapauksena improvisaatioon perustuvaa Katulavatanssit-tapahtumakonseptia. Metodina on
kvalitatiivinen haastattelu- ja kyselyaineiston analysointi. Lisäksi ymmärrystä tanssista poliittisena täydennetään pääpiirteisellä
kuvauksella modernin tanssin synnystä Yhdysvalloissa.
Yksi tutkielman keskeisistä havainnoista on, että tanssi korreloi itse asiassa saumattomasti politiikan prosessikäsityksen kanssa;
tanssi ei oman toimintansa lisäksi muodosta mitään ulkoista päämäärää tai lopputulosta. Käsitys muuttaa tosin hiukan muotoaan,
kun tanssia ei katsota vain filosofialle tyypillisestä metaforisesta näkökulmasta, vaan tanssitaiteen itsensä kautta. Sekä
Katulavatanssit-tapaus että nopea katsaus modernin tanssin historiaan osoittaa, että tanssi muodostuu aina kahden jännitteen –
koreografia ja improvisaatio – ympärille. Näin tanssi muodostaa kaksisuuntaisen paradigman, jonka kautta politiikkaa voidaan
jäsentää havainnoimalla kuinka nämä kaksi jännitettä tulevat valitussa kontekstissa esiin.
Lopulta tutkielmassa palataan perinteisempään politiikan tutkimukseen tarkastelemalla liberaalin demokratian vaalijärjestelmää
muodostetun paradigman kautta. Ehkä hiukan yllättävä johtopäätös on, että kaksisuuntainen prosessikäsitys kuvastaa osittain nk.
elitististä käsitystä demokratiasta, jonka tunnetuimpia hahmoja on Joseph Schumpeter. Jos vaalit nähdään puhtaana kilpailuna
äänistä, tämä voidaan kuvata tyypillisenä improvisaationa, joka on sidottu minimaaliseen rakenteeseen. Toisaalta tämä kilpailun tila
on täyttynyt poliittisista puolueista ja intressiryhmistä, jotka edustavat tyypillisesti tiukkaan sidottua koreografiaa.
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41 Introduction
Point of departure
Dance and its connection to politics is the starting point of this study. The aim is to find
out in what way dance can be defined as political. Furthermore, if dance is political it
must bear a meaning in relation to a more conventional understanding of politics. An
improvisational street dancing concept is used as a case supporting the understanding of
dance as political.
In general, arts and performativity can be seen as marginal or supplementary areas of
politics – this view paves the way for ‘stretching the concept of politics’ in the field of
political research. Core questions are then modelled on a broad conception of politics,
nevertheless focusing on specific political phenomena where dance or other arts are used
as tools of political action. In studies of this kind dance and politics are evidently
understood in a rather traditional way – dance is by definition a certain type of movement
and as such bears no automatic relation to politics, unless it is analysed in the context of
a political arena in the conventional meaning of the word such as democratization or
political oppression. In other words, dance and politics are in these studies clearly separate
categories. The contents of both dance and politics are seen as more or less given and it
is the task of the researcher to point out how one is connected to the other in a chosen
context. While studies like these succeed in grasping interesting phenomena, there is little
room for reflection regarding the conception of politics or the political itself. The main
motive behind this study is then to take a step further into problematizing and exploring
the concept of politics. Dance is not presented here as merely one more theme or
complementary area of study in the field of politics, but rather brought to the centre of
political research by examining the ways in which it can be seen as revealing something
essential about politics. Following some classical formulations of the political and taking
into account the status of dance in current political philosophy, this study is essentially
an inquiry into the extent to which dance can be seen as central to the category of politics.
The background of this study is an improvisational dance event concept, Katulavatanssit,
taking place in the streets and in other public places. It has now been organized for nearly
three years mainly in Helsinki, but also for instance in Stockholm, Tallinn, London and
Reykjavik. The initial interest in the case is my own participant and co-organiser role ithe
event concept. On a personal level my political interest has its origin in experiences of
5approaching various kinds of excluded or marginalized groups that I normally have no
connection to, such as homeless people and beggars. In this study, however, the aim is
not to formulate an in-depth description of a novel politics of place where dance is seen
as a tool of approaching marginalised groups and thus altering existing social hierarchies.
Instead, the task is to use Katulavatanssit as an exemplifying case in formulating dance
as political in essence. This will be linked to the overall horizon of some central themes
in the political philosophy of the 20th century, an aspect that will be remarked upon in the
course of the theoretical framework.
Previous research
Previous research on dance and politics is in the following grouped loosely according to
orientation and field of research: anthropology, dance/performance arts studies and
political philosophy. In addition, a brief look at the so called situationist movement of the
mid-20th century is used for identifying relevant aspects for this study. The overview is
not exhaustive but rather points out in which ways it is possible to approach the question
of dance as political.
As mentioned in the beginning, this study does not focus on dance as a tool or enabling
practice of politics. Indeed, studies that examine the specific meaning of dance in various
political contexts have been conducted in the field of anthropology; for instance, Lisa
Gilman (2009) sheds light on the meaning of dance for women’s political empowerment
and democratization in general in Malawi. In a similar vein, dance can be seen as an arena
of communication and thought exchange and as such meaningful to the creation of
national or social identities (Sisson 1995; Ness 1992). These studies typically focus on
the dynamics of a certain (often non-Western) community. This is in a sense reflective of
the origin of some dance forms; in many cultures dance has indeed had community-
building or power-resisting features, such as in the case of Brazilian capoeira and African
American street dance.
Dance as a discipline and area of study has naturally its own understanding of the political.
On one hand it enfolds as the internal power struggle of the very definition of dance and
its form; especially in the US, a key historical disjunction occurs in the break between
classical ballet and its modern and contemporary followers, most notably highlighted in
the mid-20th century by the work of dancer and choreographer Merce Cunningham whose
influence and importance for the field of dance and for this study are examined more
closely in chapter 5. On the other hand, the professional field of dance has a relation to
6the meaning of politics in general; politics can be seen as an external signifier and
constraint of the artistic profession or it can be reflected in the very “political” nature of
the body itself. Dance and choreography can for instance be seen as central to the
performing of social roles and identities, such as gender roles (Kolb 2009). For some
dance researchers and historians dance is the embodiment of power struggle in cases
where dance is used as a tool of political activism (Prickett 2013) or where a specific
dance form itself is seen as an act of freedom (Burt 2014).
Another stream of artistic movement needs to be mentioned here, although its ties to
dance are close to non-existent: the 1950’s and 60’s situationist movement. Its roots in
avant-garde art such as Dadaism and Surrealism, the situationists sought to attack the
capitalist mode of mass production which in their view had alienated art from everyday
life. Key figures of the movement became the Danish painter, sculptor and writer Asger
Jorn and political theorist Guy Debord. The capitalist ‘spectacle’ (see Debord 1968) was
to be shattered by newly created moments, or ‘situations’, where one could find liberation
from the monotony of modern mass society. The situationists would typically engage in
occupations of university grounds or other public spaces and create their own graphic art
and propaganda materials to be spread around – the underlying idea was to replace the
constant stream of advertisements imposed upon everyone living in a consumer society
with counter propaganda. Any kind of alternative being, often in the form of some avant-
garde style of artistic happening was a typical trait of the situationist movement. One
could perhaps try to place the case chosen for this study in a situationist context by seeing
how dancing in the streets alters the rigid behaviour of everyday life in an urban
environment and thus presents itself as political. However, the aim is to show that the
more accurate point of reference in this case is the overall landscape of the late modern
society that is seen as suffering from various forms of pathologies. We find this depiction
of a society-on-the-verge-of-collapse not only in Debord, but also in Arendt’s lament over
the death of the political and in much of the 20th century political thought haunted by the
ghost of nihilism. Furthermore, Katulavatanssit has no outspoken political agenda like
that of the situationists. Instead, I believe the political implications of the KLT case lie
not in an explicit political agenda and content, but in its capability of exposing the general
logic of politics itself. In other words, by exposing the totality it belongs to it is the
paradigm of politics, as will be further developed.
7In this study the focus is then on approaches according to which dance is not an attribute
or community/identity-building practice of politics. Also, bearing in mind the efforts of
the situationists to recuperate the capitalist order by bringing arts, as well as politics, “to
the streets” again1, the chosen case is placed in another framework that is more precisely
focused on the aspect of dance itself as a political praxis. Seen against the background of
the 20th century inquiries into the modern mass society dance has its place in the political
thought of the 20th century and offers, as it were, a keyword for explicating a ‘proper
being’ extraneous to objectifying power matrixes. For Jean-Luc Nancy (2015) dance is
the “return to oneself” and the truly free space where singularity intersects with plurality.
In a similar manner, Giorgio Agamben (2000) defines dance as the praxis of pure gesture
that marks the opening of a space of pure mediality. For Alain Badiou (2005b), dance is
in itself a way of creating a truth; it is a metaphor for thought that functions according to
its own logic. Briefly summarized, dance is in this understanding not simply movement,
but the manifestation of a mode of being beyond language and power apparatuses.
Research questions
The task is then to construct an ontology of politics formulated upon the concept of dance.
I start by defining the political as pure means, as a plural “space of appearance” (Arendt
1998 [1958]) where “men, not Man” (ibid.) come together to speak and act together. An
important feature of Arendt’s definition is that the political space is established and
maintained through action itself – it is not designed to create certain ends or products.
This said, dance in its natural absence of product will be brought into the sphere of the
political and extended in its central definition to the point where it becomes identical with
the semantic field of politics. This is a task guided by the following question:
1. In what way can dance be seen as the paradigm of all politics (understood as a
space of pure means)?
The conception of politics-as-pure-means is also predominant in Giorgio Agamben’s
thought. Dance is a special case for Agamben insofar as it exhibits an activity that is an
actual ongoing process but nevertheless escapes being towards and end – it is
simultaneously operative and inoperative. It follows quite naturally that this definition
does not refer to a specific type of political outcomes or a concrete place where politics
should take place – instead, it points towards a proper politics in kind, as will be examined
1 “Beauty is in the streets again!” was one of the situationist slogans, see poster from 1968 at:
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9018366v.r=la+beaute+est+dans+la+rue.langFR.
8more closely in chapters 3 and 4. However, the specific nature of dance-as-pure-means
can be understood in two ways: either dance marks the sphere of pure mediality regardless
of its type (genre) or, there is an ontological difference between compositional dance and
improvisation. Although dance is explicitly addressed by for instance Agamben and
Badiou, at some points it remains unclear whether they talk about dance as
genre/choreography or dance as any kind of free movement for its own sake. One
additional question is then:
2. How does the difference between choreography and improvisational dance shape
the conception of dance as the paradigm of politics?
The aim is not to provide an exhaustive definition of dance; rather, it is a necessary task
to examine to what extent the difference between choreography and improvisation is
relevant to the question of dance as political. This binary opposition is not reflective of
dance as an art form in any absolute sense, but is here used to point out some key
cleavages in the conception of dance. The difference between choreography and genre on
one hand and non-narrative dance and improvisation on the other, is in fact one of the
central questions that have shaped the field of modern and contemporary dance. It might
not and is not the central task of this study to dwell on the definition of dance, but it
remains a point to be clarified. This is explicated more thoroughly in chapter 5.
Finally, it needs to be pointed out in what way the body of theory and the specific status
of the Katulavatanssit case are of relevance to the study of politics or a more conventional
understanding of politics. Thus, the final research question is:
3. If dance is the paradigm of politics, what can it tell us about politics understood
in a conventional way?
The term ‘conventional’ is used in this context to bring the theoretical discussion back to
the centre of political research and assessing in what way a conception of dance as politics
can offer to more traditional fields of study. In this study I have chosen to view the
representative government and some aspects of democracy from the viewpoint of dance.
Structure of research and methodology
The central task of this study is the formulation of dance as politics, which is primarily a
heavily theoretical project. The Katulavatanssit case will be utilized to point out some
key areas of this construction every step of the way, taking into consideration both the
status of dance in political philosophy and some key events in the recent history of dance.
9The basic orientation in terms of exploring the case is a qualitative analysis of text and
interview material.
This study begins with a presentation of the Katulavatanssit case as a pathway to the
theoretical foundation for dance as political. In this chapter (2) I rely mainly on a
questionnaire material gathered in spring 2015 for the purposes of a photographic
exhibition on Katulavatanssit. The theoretical framework in turn starts from a classical
definition of the political, namely that of Hannah Arendt – this will be presented in
chapter 3. This opens up the field of pure means which will be a conceptual frame guiding
the whole thesis. In this framework the specific status of dance, as defined and theorized
on by thinkers like Agamben, Nancy and Badiou, is under closer scrutiny in chapter 4. I
also extend my theoretical ground to the field of dance by presenting a brief history of a
particular line of development in the dance world in chapter 5. The aim of this chapter is
to shed some new light on the question of choreography versus improvisation and its
meaning to the status of dance as political. The brief history from Graham through
Cunningham and Paxton is itself a singular story in the field of dance; it is not all-
encompassing but is used here to clarify and restructure some questions that arise from
this particular body of theory.
After the theoretical construction in chapters 3, 4 and 5 the aim is to pick up the trail left
by the first chapter and point out relevant aspects of the case that need further elaboration.
The aim is to study the extent to which the case represents improvisation and spontaneity
in general and to define in what way this is of relevance for a study in politics. This
chapter (6) draws its main empirical material from interviews made in spring 2016 and
forms a bridge to the final research question: what does dance as the paradigm of politics
mean to a more conventional understanding of politics?
The Katulavatanssit case is the exemplifying substance that will help to glue the
examination of dance as politics together. Apart from analyzing previously acquired
material of the case, additional interviews are utilised to further explore the meaning of
improvisation and its relevance for the construction of dance as the paradigm of politics.
Key concepts
The following concepts need to be defined in the context of this study: ‘paradigm’,
‘improvisation’ and ‘choreography’. How politics itself is understood here is more closely
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defined in the following chapter and to some extent, as will be further developed, it is
under scrutiny throughout the whole study.
The perhaps most known context for the term ‘paradigm’ is Thomas Kuhn’s definition of
a scientific paradigm in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); here a
paradigm is most often interpreted as the shared framework of beliefs and practices that
hold together a scientific discipline. This is also the general, everyday definition of a
paradigm – it is a shared system of beliefs. Agamben (2002) states in one of his lectures
that Kuhn identified two meanings for the word paradigm; the first one was exactly the
shared system of beliefs and rules of a scientific community and the other was more
closely linked to the original meaning of the word ‘parádeigma’, meaning “beside itself”
and used in Greek for “example”. For Agamben the latter is the kernel of the meaning of
paradigm; it is “an example that defines the intelligibility of the set to which it belongs
and, at the same time, it constitutes it”. That is to say, the example appears as the
exposition of the set that it makes intelligible in a new context – in this way, the example
always contains a manifestation of the totality it belongs to. In this study, the paradigm is
precisely this kind of “a singularity which with showing itself as such produces a new
ontological context” (ibid.). The aim is to find out in which way dance as a paradigm, an
example, opens up a new field or context where it makes itself intelligible as politics.
The term ‘choreography’ is derived from Greek and literally means to dance-write.
‘Choreia’ is in fact the name of a circle dance accompanied by singing (see e.g. Ley 2007)
practiced in ancient Greece; such dance forms can also be found elsewhere with
etymologically similar names for instance in Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Moldavia and
the Balkan region. In modern usage of the word it is usually understood as a composition
of movement, although it is a relatively recent phenomenon to call the creators of dance
choreographers – Bernard (1996) has noted that in the US, the legendary Russian ballet
director George Balanchine was the first one to be called by the specific title of a
choreographer in 1936.
In this study the word choreography is used to describe any kind of predetermined
movement. Typically this would be understood as precisely the composed work of a
dance professional, but in some contexts I also use it to describe certain dance traditions
such as salsa or tango. These would perhaps not in general be described as choreographies,
but they do rely on their own movement conventions – in this sense, they are
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predetermined. ‘Improvisation’, in contrast, is simply defined as the opposite of a
predetermined movement vocabulary; it is spontaneously initiated, unpredictable and
movements are chosen by the performer, not by an outside choreographer or teacher. Of
course, improvisation seldom happens completely freely without any rules – in music,
dance, theatre and most art forms some structures and predetermined techniques, scales
and gestures are nearly always decided beforehand. And on the other hand it is
questionable whether there is a choreography or dance tradition with no space for personal
volition or freedom of choice. As for the purposes of this study however, the tension
between choreography and improvisation is precisely a central part of the whole question
of dance as political. By relying on such a general understanding of the two terms the aim
is to see how the freedom-structure axis can be of use in the construction of dance as the
paradigm of politics.
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2 Katulavatanssit
Katulavatanssit is the name of an event concept built on a rather simple principle: guided
by a two to three hours’ playlist people are invited to dance around the city in a way they
feel comfortable with. The first events of this kind were organised in Helsinki in spring
2013. Around the same time Ben Aron, a TV reporter from the US, had launched a form
of urban exercise he called dance walking, a concept that spurred mass events with people
dancing around the streets listening either to their own favourite music or a shared playlist
through portable music devices with headphones. A few dance walking events were
organised in Finland at that time and similar events are still being organized sporadically
– the Dance walk Helsinki group on Facebook has around 80 members. Katulavatanssit
has been organised more systematically since its formation and continues to develop the
concept into various directions, for example art gallery dancing. The group on Facebook,
which is also the main information channel for the events, has today over 1500 members.
Events by this name have been organised now around 30 times, mostly during warmer
seasons but also a few times in the winter.
Key to the whole concept, from now on simply KLT, is the lack of set rules or specific
requirements for the participants. The concept is a kind of temporary frame for any kind
of improvised movement – it often happens that participants get inspired to climb up on
statues, lamp-posts and scaffolds. Music is played with a portable amplifier that is
dragged along by dancers taking turns. The playlist is often rather unconventional
compared to many nightclubs as there is no specific genre or theme; instead, a KLT
playlist can be comprised of a combination of opera arias, children’s songs, heavy rock,
old pop hits, folk tunes and even religious hymns. However, the selection of music is
perhaps genuinely unconventional and surprising mainly for first-time participants – after
a few times the odd mixture becomes in a sense a convention of its own. I will return to
the role of music in chapters 5 and 6 as the status of the case and dance in general are
further developed.
During a nearly three year’s journey KLT has gathered a core group of participants, but
new people turn up for every event. The average participant number for the dancing in
the street is around 20-40 people. A special event was organised in August 2015 in the
Helsinki underground, as part of the programme for the 70th anniversary of Helsinki City
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Transport2 – this particular event gathered over a hundred participants. In connection to
this event a photographic exhibition was set up by main organiser Lauri Jäntti and co-
organiser Miila Vainio. The questionnaire material used in this study was part of this
exhibition in which extracts from the responses were coupled with photographs.
The questionnaire received eighteen freely formulated answers, the length being from
half a page to three pages. In the next section the aim is to paint a more detailed picture
of KLT drawing mainly from the experiences of participants that responded to the
questionnaire3. I focus first on the notion of improvisation that seemed important for the
greater part of respondents – 13 out of 18 mentioned in some way “free movement”,
“movement without genre” or “improvisation” as an important part of their dancing
experience. After that I look into the aspect of togetherness; along with improvised
movement a particularly important part of engaging in dancing in the streets seemed to
be creating a space of mutual action. Finally, I explore a few aspects that prompt further
questions on the status of the KLT concept.
2.1 Improvisation
As mentioned above, many respondents brought up the importance of the type of dance
that KLT represents, either by describing free movement in general or by contrasting it
to other types of dance, for instance dance lessons. A long-time participant (Respondent
4), glanced back at her first KLT experience and related it to her previous dancing
background: “[m]y dancing experience was limited to salsa at that time. Free dancing –
improvisation was something completely new.” In a similar way, a first-time participant
who was grabbed into the dance while sitting on the stairs of the Helsinki Cathedral, stated
that “I got inspired by the escapade and the fact that there was no choreography”
(Respondent 8).
One participant (Respondent 14) concluded that “[i]t was the most free and expressive
dance form I had ever experienced” and that by participating in events like this had helped
her feel freer in other contexts as well: “I can throw back inhibitions, and dance freely in
the streets anywhere I like”. Likewise, another respondent (1) expressed how the
experience of dancing in the streets presented a way of being herself in a way that she felt
was not possible in other forms of dance.  This aspect is in fact closely related to an
2 See http://www.taidelinja.fi/en for more information about the cultural events organised by HKL,
Helsinki City Transport.
3 All respondents are numbered from 1 to 18 and referred to anonymously.
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additional notion brought up by several respondents – the participant’s feeling of personal
emancipation, increased boldness and self-confidence in other contexts and the sheer joy
of doing something new and different. Some even explicitly used the word “therapy” to
describe their experience. Insofar as the term therapy refers to a personal project of
increasing self-confidence it is in a sense outside the scope of this study. However, the
fact that free movement in the streets – that is, lack of choreography – is precisely what
triggers these moments of self-realisation, is of a specific kind of importance to the study
of dance as political. That something is “therapeutic” means quite literally that it is
healing or curing, that is, a treatment for something that is bad, wrong or otherwise in
need of a fix. This theme is taken up for closer scrutiny in chapter 6 where I return to the
KLT case.
2.2 Mutual action
Another frequently occurring theme was a unique feeling of doing things together both
with people within the group of dancers and with pass-byers. In a somewhat similar
manner that some felt empowered by dancing one respondent brought up the “relative
safety within the group” (Respondent 5) that made him more daring in trying out new
things; another one was inspired by random pass-byers that joined in just for a few dance
steps: “a middle-aged man performed three dance steps and continued right way. That’s
it. I can still remember it” (Respondent 16). Some described on a more general level how
KLT served as a platform for creating a mutual playground for creativity, a space of
togetherness. Again, in contrast to dance lessons of a particular genre, a few respondents
noted that there seemed to be a lack of clear hierarchy among participants and that it was
relatively easy to dance both with group members and strangers. As a concluding remark
one respondent (5) wrote that “Hopefully soon, public spaces can once again be centres
of urban communal experiences”.
With regards to a space of togetherness, it needs to be mentioned that along with clearly
pointing to an immaterial, shared space that opens up through dance taking over the streets,
some participants also described how the city environment as a concrete place was painted
with new colours through dance. Moving in the streets was seen as a chance to
“incorporate aspects of urban architecture” into the dance (Respondent 5) and to “spice
up the urban space with altering music” (Respondent 10). Simply using familiar places in
the city as dance floors seemed to offer a platform for new kinds of explorations and made
the city look different. Using the space in a different way also meant an interesting way
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of breaking the monotony of simply moving from one place to another. One respondent
(6) compared KLT to skaters who also “use the space differently, they seem not just to
move by, –, they carry on some meanings too”.
For the purposes of this study, I emphasize the meaning of space precisely as a space of
action and being-otherwise, not as the physical space as such which is being altered
through dance, although these can of course overlap to some extent. Its distinctive trait is
that it is a space which, according to most respondents, is created during the dance event
and is “available for everybody” (Respondent 6).
2.3 The limits of spontaneity
Finally, a few worries came up when reading the responses. Some were rather general in
character, such as the fear of disturbing other people too much or being an obstacle for
cars and trams. A professional performance artist was intrigued by how to get even more
random people to join in. A couple of answers, however, illuminated a rather interesting
issue, although it was not strictly speaking expressed as a problem or even a challenge.
One participant (Respondent 4) described how on one hand she had become more
experimenting in her dance after participating several times, but at the same time she had
made KLT into a “comfort zone” where she tends to move in a way that suits this
particular concept. Another respondent (5) presented a slightly more sinister hint by
saying that “[i]n a way, it has now almost become a marketplace for movement styles and
philosophies”. This points at an obvious issue that can be thought of being connected to
virtually anything that has a name – after a while it loses its originality and creates its
own internal modes of being and expected behaviour patterns. I return to this question in
chapter 6 where I revisit the KLT case and in chapter 7 where I draw up the contours of
what dance thought as political can tell us about political systems in general.
As already mentioned in the introduction, the theoretical terrain is opened in the next
chapter by defining politics as an Arendtian plural space of appearance. To this end, the
notions of KLT creating a specific space for acting together carries a specific meaning for
the purposes of this study. Consequently, I leave out the aspect of the urban environment
as a concrete physical environment that is being reorganised through dance. In addition,
I take interest in the comments on free movement and improvisation versus dance lessons.
Insofar as personal empowerment and therapeutic dimensions are quite apparent for some
respondents, I intend to clarify how or to what extent this might be relevant for the
conception of dance as the paradigm of politics.
16
3 Definition of politics: Hannah Arendt and the sphere of action
In this chapter the political is examined from the viewpoint of Hannah Arendt. For Arendt,
as briefly mentioned in the introduction, the political can only be thought of in terms of
praxis, a process with no end outside itself. The term ‘praxis’ in ancient Greek was used
to signify the activity of free men – engaging in the polis life was the sphere of practising
politics.4 While it can be stated that in her account of the political Arendt was selective
in the sense that she never fully addressed some key questions such as justice and actually
existing social hierarchies (see e.g. Wolin 1983, 9), the aim of this study is to examine
the human capability to action as a general condition given to all humanity and even more
importantly, define in which way dance can be seen as reflective of this condition.
One of Arendt’s main concerns was the erosion of the political sphere in modern times.
This was according to her connected to the fact that action has always, even in the times
of ancient Greece which she founded much of her writings in Human Condition (1998
[1958]), been treated with suspicion due to its inherent unpredictability and irreversibility
– when we act, we never control the consequences of our action because we do not make
it in the same way as we make things. We then see historically different types of settings
with the aim to control this human unpredictability, for instance in monarchy where
literally one man has monopolised the sphere of action and replaced it with one-man rule.
Also the Socratic school, in their wish to make laws and build walls instead of just
engaging in idle contemplation, was preoccupied with the eradication of this “futility”
(ibid. 195–221.).
The relevance of an Arendtian view on politics as praxis is connected to the type of
activity that dance represents. Just as engaging in the polis life was political in itself for
the freemen of ancient Athens, dance is equally void of any external ends. Arendt
mentions dance along with other artistic professions when she states that among all
activities in ancient Greece certain types of activities such as “healing, flute-playing, play-
acting” were of special importance precisely because in these “the ‘product’ is identical
with the performance act itself” (Arendt 1998, 206–207). However, there is slight
ambiguity in terms of activities like the above mentioned, including dance. In some
contexts for instance theatre seems to be “political art par excellance” (ibid, 188) because
4 Apart from praxis, Aristotle identified two other modes of being that were inherent to humans: theoria
(the search for truth) and poiesis (the making and producing of things).
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it imitates nothing but human relationships directly, that is, the sphere of action and
speech where men appear to each other. In other contexts Arendt likens artistic
professions with action because they exemplify “the highest and greatest activities of man”
(Arendt 1998, 207), precisely because they rely on performance, i.e. praxis. In this sense
they would not be classified as mere imitators of human affairs. The question seems to be
whether dance (or other arts) can be seen as political praxis or not – I return to this in
section 2.3.
I start by briefly summarising the main idea of Arendt’s division of human life into three
basic activities: labour, work and action. In the next section the spheres of labour and
work are presented; this in turn will be ground for the more specific interest I take in the
sphere of action which Arendt sees as key to all political life – this is examined in section
2.2. Finally, I end this chapter by focusing more concretely on the potential status that
dance might occupy when perceived through the thought of Arendt.
2.1 Labour and work – animal laborans and homo faber
Human life, such as it comes to existence on the planet we inhabit, is built on three
activities that Arendt defines as labour, work and action. Together these form the totality
of human activities, vita activa. Labour is the sphere that functions through the logic of
life itself and the “metabolism of nature” as Arendt calls it frequently – its main activity
is the sustenance of life itself. So called ordinary life, such as household work and food
production, would then be labelled as labour according to Arendt.
In ancient Greece these ‘life processes’ were strictly kept out of the polis life, mainly
through excessive use of slavery as we know from many historical accounts. According
to Arendt (1998, 119) “[s]lavery became the social condition of the labouring classes
because it was felt that it was the natural condition of life itself”. Slavery was then the
automatic and self-evident, if not morally correct, solution to the wish of mastering the
necessities of life. Accordingly, while never dwelling long on the topic of slavery from
then point of view of justice, she stated that “[t]he life of an exploiter or slave-holder and
the life of a parasite may be unjust, but they are certainly human” (ibid. 176). The main
point is that for Arendt, the problem with modernity is the extension of the household rule
to the sphere of action – a reversal that introduces a standard alien to the modality of
action. While the household (the private) is driven by necessities we all share as humans,
the main mode to characterise the sphere of action (the public) is freedom. It is out of this
simple reason that the ancient Greeks in a sense bought their freedom and possibility to
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attend public life by the cost of slaves. Consequently, occupations that were taken not
because of their own sake but in order to sustain life itself, were seen as labour. Even
occupations that would not be labelled slavish in modern usage of the word – such as
salesmen of various kinds – were seen as labour-oriented as their main purpose was to
sell commodities for immediate consumption. As such they were parts of the ever ongoing
processes of life itself.
In the sphere of work, in contrast to that of labour, human beings present themselves as
fabricators and makers of the world, as homines faber; they erect the world building by
building and create the necessary tools for its maintenance. Although it is possible to find
fabricating in the world of the animal laborans, it is always in the form of consumer
products that find their way back to the reproduction of the life cycle. Fabrication, on the
other hand, has a clear beginning and an end – homo faber is able to produce tools and
objects for more durable use. Interestingly, it seemed to be debatable already in ancient
times what value was to be given to different types of artistic professions. As already
mentioned, play-acting was according to Arendt seen as one of the highest forms of art –
it belonged in the sphere of fabrication, but was of great importance to the imitation,
mimēsis, of great and heroic deeds of free men. As already brought up, for Arendt theatre
reflected something political because only in theatre “is the political sphere of human life
transposed into art” (Arendt 1998, 188).
The rules and standards that govern the world of homo faber – as in the case of animal
laborans – are not problematic per se. For Arendt, instrumentality that characterises the
activities of homo faber is not problematic when establishing the world of objects – it
becomes disastrous when moving into the political realm. While fabricating is necessary
when erecting the physical space where we encounter other people and simply live our
lives, we should not let its clear-cut means-end operations disturb the activities of the
political. For the political needs no end to justify it, it is never the instrument of anything
but its own mode of being. This is precisely one of the greatest problems of modernity;
we have come to perceive the world around us as a society, that is, a giant machine that
can be ruled through predictable, automatized rules of measurement that are so inherent
in manufacturing processes. Arendt thus concludes that “modern age was as intent on
excluding political man, that is, man who acts and speaks, from its public realm as
antiquity was on excluding homo faber” (Arendt 1998, 159).
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In the next section the main focus is on the “political man” as the source of politics. This
will be ground for the formulation of dance as a political praxis. However, some aspects
of both the spheres of labour and fabrication, as briefly presented here, are taken up for
closer examination in chapter 6 where the Katulavatanssit case is likewise revisited.
2.2 The man of speech and action
The ability to act and speak together is what makes us political beings according to Arendt.
Although it was necessary in ancient Greece to separate the private and the public realm
by literally building walls between them, “[t]he polis, properly speaking, is not the city-
state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting
and speaking together” (Arendt 1998, 198). This space is the source of new kinds of action
and as such it transcends the mortality of individual life. Key to this action is agency –
every act needs the disclosure of an agent because without it an act would be meaningless
and unknown to the sphere of action where people face each other. In distinction to the
toils of labour and the fabrication processes of work that can be done in complete isolation,
action is always done in the presence of and as a disclosure to other humans. In the
presence of others we act and speak and as such create stories that are ground for
remembrance – this is how we build up a world that can exist even though individual life
is momentary and futile. And although we appear in these stories as agents, we do not
strictly speaking make these stories:
“The real story in which we are engaged as long as we live has no visible or
invisible maker because it is not made. The only ‘somebody’ it reveals is its
hero, and it is the only medium in which the originally intangible
manifestation of a uniquely distinct ‘who’ can become tangible ex post facto
through action and speech” (ibid. 186).
The speaking agent is manifest precisely in the constant flux of acting and speaking that,
as it were comes from nowhere (i.e. is not made).
Along with agency another important part in the sphere of action is unpredictability and
irreversibility. As already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, according to Arendt
we can never fully control the consequences and meanings of our action. The sphere of
action is boundless, limitless and unpredictable because each new agent that pops into its
already existing web of human relationships can control neither its own actions nor the
actions of others. According to Arendt limits between the private and the public were so
strictly drawn in ancient times precisely because no such limits are bound to arise from
the sphere of action itself (Arendt 1998, 190–191). Interestingly then, Arendt’s
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conception of establishing the political sphere is not to be confused with the 17th century
contractionist view according to which a boundless and chaotic ‘human nature’ needs to
be tamed by political organisation; on the contrary, the relationship of a ruler and the
ruled was for her completely incompatible with the standards of the political realm.
Moreover, not even in ancient Greece was the mode of human plurality and
unpredictability met without caution; when Plato demanded that a strict division between
the ruler and the ruled be established, and that e.g. marital status be abolished, he pointed
towards a general order of human affairs, not to politics as such – he was very well aware
that the ‘true’ nature of the political lay in the unpredictable nature of plurality that cannot
be ruled by one sovereign.
As a plural space of appearance the Arendtian political is then a space of freedom in the
sense that its agents cannot take complete control of it and remain thus the anonymous
agents of the deeds and words that arise from it. It is worth noting that Arendt did not see
this as the source of good action only; quite the opposite, precisely because of this
unpredictability can humans initiate harmful action, whether intentional or not. What is
also of relevance is that this common space of action is a meeting point for unequals for
instance in terms of income – the ancient city states were not exceptional in their time
because of their inclusion of everyone in the polis life, but because free men could attend
public life regardless of the amount of property they owned. Outside the context of ancient
times it can be thought of as a general ideal according to which the political is first of all
a modality possible to all human beings and secondly a sphere of unpredictable action
that is unproductive in the sense that its aim is not to fabricate anything.
2.3 Dance as praxis
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, a few comments need to be made on
Arendt’s view of arts in relation to praxis. Although the aim is not to focus too much on
arts in general, this brief examination will create a ground for formulating dance as
politics.
Among the activities within the sphere of work, Arendt concludes, various artistic
professions belong to more sophisticated forms of work as they are capable of producing
pieces of art that can endure a considerable length of time. A piece of music for instance
can, and indeed has in the course of Western history of art music, survive for centuries –
at least in its notated form. And even without scores we still know melodies from past
centuries that have been passed on from mouth to mouth. The same logic can easily be
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applied to poetry as well; either the poem is written down on a piece of paper and restored
throughout centuries and millennia or it finds its way to later times as an oral tradition.
What is of relevance in the light of Arendt is the fact that although even the finest pieces
of art may seem immortal, they are always the work of a specific artist. They come into
existence from the deliberate mind process of the artist and are in other words products
of some kind (Arendt 1998, 168–169).
As already highlighted above, some art forms such as theatre appear to be remarkable for
Arendt because they manage to imitate the sphere of human relationships. Play-acts
themselves, along with literature in general, can also function as illustrations of the heroic
stories of action and thus be instruments of remembrance:
“[A]cting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his highest
capacity, that is, the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of
monument-builders of writers, because without them the only product of their
activity, the story they enact and tell, would not survive at all” (Arendt 1998,
173)
Following the line of thought in Arendt’s account of arts, we could in general conclude
that art forms are respectable because they contribute to the human artifice by producing
objects, as in artworks, of durable use. This description owes much to the hierarchies that
could be found in ancient Greece where for instance play-acting was much respected. She
seems however to be somewhat undecided on whether artistic work really is a work
among others – although more respectable – or, if engagement in for instance “flute-
playing” exhibits the very transcending of the means-end category. While accounting
beautifully for the importance of artwork in the chapter on work in Human Condition, she
returns to the subject in the chapter on action in the context of the Aristotelian idea of
energeia, full actuality. Aristotle originally referred to for instance flute-playing with the
concept of energeia and what is of relevance for Arendt is precisely the kind of activity
where “the work is not what follows and extinguishes the process but is embedded in it;
the performance is the work, is energeia” (ibid. 206). For Arendt this is the main
characteristic of political life, the work of man that is itself sheer actuality; the work exists
only in the process itself. For the purposes of this study the interesting notion however is
that in the context of Aristotle’s energeia, Arendt gives artistic professions a slightly
different meaning; instead of being the illustrator and memoriser of human action the
artist in fact becomes the performer of an act where the work is embedded. While she
laments the view according to which politics belongs to the arts – a view that has persisted
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since the times of Plato at least – she nevertheless ends the very same paragraph by stating
that arts (and not politics) were viewed in ancient times as “the highest and greatest
activities of man” (Arendt 1998, 207).
In conlusion, certain forms of artistic activities are indeed praxis for Arendt, but not of a
political kind. When blaming Adam Smith of degrading artistic occupations (along with
other professions such as churchmen and lawyers who nevertheless rest on performance)
by describing them as the lowest and unproductive forms of labour, Arendt sees this as
an illustrative example of what has happened to action and speech – they too have
gradually lost their position as the highest activity of man (ibid. 206–207). In other words,
what has happened to art or what art is, reflects itself in politics as they both engage in an
activity where the work is embedded.
Although Arendt did not seem inclined to classify dance as politics, the argument in this
study is that that dance in fact corresponds exactly to Arendt’s definition of the political:
instead of moving from point A to B (means-end) and thus producing an object outside
itself, the ‘product’ or ‘work’ of dance is in the movement itself. In terms of art in general,
as has been dwelled upon in this chapter, one might of course argue that other arts might
equally be brought to the centre of politics. In the case of theatre, the main concern in this
study is however not the one presented by Arendt – for her theatre displayed political
traits simply because it managed to imitate the polis life. Instead, the key point is that
theatre, as well as dance, could be described as a process where the work is embedded.
Likewise, music – although one would need an instrument or a singing voice to bring it
into being – can also be thought of in similar terms.
The main motivation for using precisely dance as the paradigmatic case of politics is on
the one hand a deliberate choice that simply draws inspiration from the correspondence
between the idea of praxis and dance. In this way, the question of how dance can be seen
as a political praxis is precisely the project under construction in this study, which is not
to say that the political status of other forms could not be explored. On the other hand,
the chosen case for this study will help to underline one particular aspect of dance that
makes it slightly different from other arts – it is perhaps one of the most accessible forms
of art. This is not to say that dance requires no skills or movement background or that this
accessibility would somehow point to a hierarchy among art forms; this is certainly a
project completely outside the aims of this study. Instead, dance is a special case because
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– as also noted by Alain Badiou as we shall see later on – it is the only art form primarily
dependant on space. The dancing body needs in principal no script, no scene, no
instrument, no painting equipment or the like, it only needs a space within which it can
take place. This idea is further developed in the course of the whole study both in the light
of the theoretical framework and by analysing the Katulavatanssit case.
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4 Dance as mediality, gesturality, absence of product
In this chapter the theme of praxis or pure means will be further developed through the
work of Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou. As examined in the
previous chapter, Arendt clearly saw the political as a form of activity collectively
exercised by acting and speaking human beings. Most importantly, this activity was to
have no other end than its own ongoing process – in this sense it cannot of course even
be called an ‘end’ at all. While Arendt insisted that the sphere of politics comes from
nowhere in the sense that it is not made, she nevertheless stressed the importance of
agency – the political sphere is engendered through and as the action of men.
Of the following thinkers most notably Giorgio Agamben has addressed the question of
what he calls mediality and also gesturality. For Agamben, as for Arendt, “[p]olitics is
the space of pure means” (Agamben 2000, 59), although he seems rather unwilling to
invest much hope in human agency; it seems that a politics based on pure means seems
to be either hopelessly hidden in the capitalist society that has invaded the space of means
and made it into its own source of production, or it is purely contingent in the sense that
we can never attain it (as it is not an end) but remains ‘to come’. Likewise, for Jean-Luc
Nancy, the idea of a political life that does not try to make, produce or create itself through
a narrative and a clear end in the future, is of key importance. Although Nancy addresses
it in the context of a community that functions through “workless and inoperative activity”
(Nancy 1991, 35), it has some clear implications to his conception of the political or
politics as will be presented in section 4.2.
All three thinkers have in some way addressed dance; Agamben and Nancy in a somewhat
similar way by seeing them as activities that make visible a state of means without an end.
Alain Badiou, on the other hand, operates with dance in a slightly different setting – for
him, various kinds of artistic activities can formulate their own ‘truths’ of being in the
sphere in which they operate. Dance is a special case for Badiou because it “depicts []
nothing” (Badiou 2005, 64) and is the manifestation of an unfixed thought. This will be
more closely explained in the last section of this chapter.
I begin by an inspection of Agamben’s formulation of politics-as-pure-means, followed
by Nancy’s inoperative being-together and its political implications. The status of dance
is closely connected to these views and will be brought up to closer inspection. Finally,
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Badiou’s view contains an important step with regards to the question of improvisation
versus choreography as will be shown.
4.1 Giorgio Agamben
As already mentioned, Agamben identifies a political mode of being in the means realm.
The sphere of pure means is, interestingly, both the object of power in the political
tradition of the West and the potential source of a salvation to come. In this section the
basic constellation of Agamben’s account of the distinction of zoē and bios is first
presented. After that a closer look is directed towards the suspended life in the intersection
between zoē and bios and the aim is to define in what way this can be seen as political –
dance is directly linked to this in-between state as will be explicated.
For Agamben, life as such is just simple being in a multitude of forms; life itself cannot
be distinguished from its form. Being as such does not have an end or a destiny; it is
simply a multitude of forms-of-life. The underlying logic of the history of occidental
political order is nevertheless the distinction of zoē and bios; zoē as the simple being of
anything and bios as a specific mode of being of an individual or a group. These terms
appear in ancient Greek and signify clearly the logic of exclusion that was apparent in the
division of the social and the political, of who should be included in the common affairs
of the polis and who should be left out (Agamben 2000, 3–4.). This is also somewhat
similar to Arendt’s distinction between ‘labour’ and ‘action’, as outlined in the previous
chapter.
In modern language use the distinction between zoē and bios has disappeared from most
European languages and in the course of the political history of the West we see a growing
degree of blurring of this distinction. Zoē, bare life, remains excluded but seems to be
included to the extent that it is almost impossible in modern days to differentiate between
the two. Bare life in the bios is nevertheless not a kind of ‘original’ human essence, it is
a kind of bare life that is only included in the bios as long as it subjects to its power
apparatuses. This is the basic calculus of any society based on sovereignty – sovereignty,
whether in its monarchical or national form, is the power over life and death and as such
it has to face life in its most easily manageable, stripped-off form.
Agamben’s example of the exile is one of the best known among his work. The exile is
nothing but bare life and can therefore not be incorporated to the power structure, he is
“the last opaque bearer of sovereignty” (Agamben 2000, 6).  The life of the exile is by
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definition a state of exclusion, yet it is included in the machinery we know as society in
this excluded form. In this sense the exile presents a way of being that is but
simultaneously cannot be objectified and designed for a certain task properly speaking.
This means that in the very existence of the exile, there is a tiny sparkle of hope – a
potentiality to unleash the power of the originary human life that cannot be an object of
power.
Language itself, the starting point of Agamben’s literary work, offers another key to
understanding the existence of life that cannot be separated from its form. The revelation
of God in the word, as depicted in a number of biblical writings, means for Agamben in
short nothing but this: the revelation of language itself. God is revealed in the word, but
at the same time he remains invisible and instead what is revealed is revelation itself:
“The meaning of revelation is that human beings can reveal beings through
language but cannot reveal language itself. In other words: humans see the
world through language but cannot reveal language itself. This invisibility of
the revealer in what is revealed is the word of God; it is revelation” (Agamben
1999, 40)
In another essay Agamben (2000, 62–67) refers to Alice Ho-Becker’s study on argot, the
secret language of European Gypsies 5  in past centuries, and disseminates a few
interesting notions on Gypsies both as a people and a language. He states that accurate
descriptions of Gypsies have been difficult to make because by moving from one place
to another, they adopted new words and partly invented stories of their traditions. While
this might be seen as merely a technical obstacle in terms of historical research, Agamben
holds that the Gypsies’ story can in fact be seen as an exemplifying case of a fundamental
aspect of language as well as peoples: all languages are inventions, jargons and mixtures
like that of the Gypsies and all peoples are gangs of “evildoers” who dwell around the
earth without a fixed purpose (ibid.) What we know as ‘people’ and ‘language’ are in this
understanding categories tailored for the purposes of sovereign use of power; they are
designed to recode jargons into grammars and peoples into state identities, which is to
say that being as such is molded into a specific kind of being: “languages are the jargons
that hide the pure experience of language” (ibid. 70).  And the pure experience of
language – like that in the revelation of God – is perhaps what we know nothing of, since
life has been separated from its form for so long in the West. But at the same time it is
5 In accordance with Agamben’s text, I use the term ’Gypsie’ here although it could also be replaced
with ’Roma’.
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the awareness of this separation that can be propelled against it. The nihilist declaration
of the death of God points according to Agamben precisely to an age where we have
become fully aware of language: “For the first time, what preceding generations called
God, Being, spirit, unconscious appear to us as what they are: names for language”
(Agamben 1999, 45). And as we become aware of the fact that it is the vision of language
itself, not a specific language or “a common imprisonment in signifying language” (ibid,
47), that unites human beings, there is perhaps some hope of restoring the originary
human life and escaping the matrix of sovereign power.
Dance is for Agamben “the process of making a means visible as such” (Agamben 2000,
57). What is of importance here is that the act of dance cannot be described as an end in
itself because there is no ‘end’ to speak of. Dance has the capability of showing, in a
similar way like the poem exhibits both language and the absence of conventional
communication simultaneously, the possibility of movement without a destination.
Rather than being a journey from point A to B, dance exhibits the travel itself as central.
This is closely linked to potentiality which Agamben takes up in several contexts to
explain the mode of being that is capable of both its action and inaction, or operativity
and inoperativity.
Drawing from Aristotle’s thoughts on potentiality, Agamben (1999) defines potentiality
as a relation to impotentiality. Being capable of an act is always in relation to the
potentiality not to act – this is why Aristotle operated with two sides of the same concept
according to Agamben; he made a distinction between a generic potentiality of for
example a child who can possibly become this or that and an existing potentiality like that
of an architect or a flute-player. The latter can simply either actualize this potentiality or
choose not to. It does not however follow that potentiality would vanish right at the
threshold of actuality, exhausting itself in the final product or performance; the not-to-do
is not the absence of being, but a mode of being that exists as its own non-being – when
we do not see light, “we see darkness” (ibid, 179–181.). Potentiality is then not simply
the skill or faculty of doing this or that, but the “potential to not-do, potential not to pass
into actuality”. This is the greatest resource of man according to Agamben, our “abyss”
of being capable of our non-action. The painter is a painter who can pass his faculty into
actuality but he can also withdraw from painting, nevertheless remaining a painter. In this
way, although not passing into actuality, potentiality survives in actuality as a potentiality
not-to-be and “preserves itself as such in actuality”. This can only mean that throughout
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an act there is always a potentiality to be otherwise: “What is truly potential is thus what
has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such” (Agamben
1999, 177–184.). It is against this background that dance can be seen in the context of
Agamben. When he speaks of dance making visible a means as such, he evidently points
to an activity that is the manifestation of a potentiality not to reach a certain destiny; dance
is of course in actuality but in this actuality the potentiality not to produce and end is
restored. Similarly, when Agamben (2000, 59) states that the political space of means is
itself the manifestation of “the absolute and complete gesturality of human beings”, he
points towards an activity where the inoperative mode of human life is activated. I return
to the specific status of dance in Agamben’s thought at the end of this chapter.
In Profanations (2007), Agamben approaches the modern political order by examining
the concept of profanation. Somewhat similarly as Carl Schmitt (2005 [1922]) announced
that any narrative of sovereign power is just the circulation of theological concepts in
another form, Agamben affirms that “[r]eligion is not what unites men and gods but what
ensures they remain distinct” (Agamben 2007, 75). For this reason he emphasises the
importance of profanation instead of secularisation; profanation means literally the
freeing of a sacred object from its particular use to free use, to any kind of use. For
Agamben, the late modern society is characterised precisely by the sacredness of the
labels given to each form of life for power exercising purposes – these realms of
sacredness, where the inoperative human forms-of-life are suspended from their
potentiality not-to-be, need to be freed from their locked up positions. This entails the
abandonment of any fixed goals or a collective destiny. Children playing with any random
objects they find in their surroundings know that an ashtray can be a bathtub today and a
soup bowl tomorrow; similarly, human life as such cannot be predetermined but rather
opened up for a multitude of possible use. Not even happiness is something we should try
to achieve: “there is only one way to achieve happiness on this earth: to believe in the
divine and not to aspire to reach at it” (Agamben 2007, 21). This idea of an abandonment
of any particular project and the affirmation of openness and unfixedness itself is at the
heart of not only Agamben’s, but also Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought as will be examined in
the next section. Similar resonances can also be found in the thoughts of composer John
Cage who was the musical director of the Cunningham dance company for years. I return
to some aspects of his work and explore their relevance in chapter 5.
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4.2 Jean-Luc Nancy
For Jean-Luc Nancy (2015) dance is “the return to oneself” as it sets into motion, or rather
is the motion of a repetitive gesture that has no external constraint. It is however not a
kind of self that has the essence of an individual because for Nancy, the whole idea of the
individual as undividable is in itself totalitarian and contrary to our ontology proper. The
‘self’ is always in a way outside the singular being in that the singular becomes aware of
its being by facing its limit.
The idea of an activity that is not linked to any other end is closely connected to Nancy’s
depiction of an “inoperative community” (Nancy 1992). Nancy states that a community
is not and cannot be a fixed group of people who share a set of common traits such as
history or future; community is rather the revelation of a limit all human beings share
with each other, namely death. There is no human essence, but only a constant exposure
to others – this is how we become aware of death, by being exposed to others. A
community that reveals itself in the shared experience of exposure and the becoming-
aware of death cannot be a community of subjects because the ‘I’ is either revealed in its
relation to others (which makes itself an other) or, it is simply nothing (i.e. death).
However, it does not follow that community would destroy original ‘selves’ in that it
extends itself above them in some way: “Community does not sublate the finitude it
exposes. Community itself, in sum, is nothing but this exposition” (ibid, 26). There are
then not ‘selves’ but rather singularities that are placed in different places in the
continuum of this exposure, and they are different to the extent that they are presented to
each other precisely as others, but this otherness is not ground for an essence.
This exposition, furthermore, is something we have “well in advance of all our projects”
(Nancy 1992, 35). We find here the same distrust of man-made things such as buildings
and institutions as in the thought of Arendt, only Nancy leaves this at the margin of his
construction of this inoperative being, time to time commenting on how politics could
possibly be like. Certainly, politics should have as its starting point this very limit of
singularities that is a community that opens itself to itself, not to some future goal or
future in general. “A politics that does not want to know anything about this is a
mythology, or an economy” (ibid. 81). Mythology is for Nancy the very articulation of a
community as communal being, as God, as humanity, as nature, that is, as one. In this
sense a myth creates the man as member of one, and this is what makes it totalitarian –
for although we exist in common, our existence is not ground for one common entity.
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A community that does not create a myth, as in a myth of the community’s oneness,
engages instead in what Nancy calls writing. The community that is freed from myth
speaks of its exposure in a myriad of writings that can be fiction, theatre, poems, but most
importantly any kinds of activities that erupt, tell a story and again meet their shared limit
of death. Dance can in this sense be seen as ‘writing’ – it speaks in its own singular way
about this intersection of the singular and the plural, insofar as the plural here means the
very limit that the absent community exposes or is the exposition of. In a similar way as
Agamben, Nancy identifies in dance the potentiality of ridding oneself of being towards
an end and facing the very mode of exposition as it is given to us. In distinction to walking
which always has a destination outside itself, dance forms its destination within itself and
thus takes the dancer first outside itself only to discover that what is to be found in that
otherness is nothing but the self in its exposure to others. While dancing, we engage in a
“play of being oneself”; in fact, being oneself is or happens in the return itself. Dance is
“the intensification of the sensitive” in that it “exposes in intensity the ‘self’ as regression,
as return”. For Nancy, key to this is repetition; by repetition of a movement, we not only
do the same thing all over again, but experience being itself, each time in a slightly
different way. In each moment our singularity builds a relation to the world and at each
turn we find the affirmation of the multitude of possible singularities that the world itself
is (Nancy 2015.).
An important question in the context of Nancy is of course the body itself. Why dance is
the intensification of being itself is because it is always the se sentir6 of the singular being;
the body itself tunes into the register of being as exposure by repeating the rhythm of
dance. The body itself, as such, becomes aware of its being in the dance – in this way, if
we can speak of places, dance is the place of the body and the being as body. In this sense
the body itself is of importance also in this study; perhaps not as a physical entity that has
been loaded with symbolic meanings, but simply as the material that finds itself in a place
of a specific kind of being, in this case dance. Although I do not speak of the body
throughout this study, it can perhaps – following Nancy’s peculiar formulations – be
nothing but the writing body that speaks. The body itself is not ‘political’ any more than
it is ‘real’ or ‘unreal’ – it manifests its political potentiality in the capability of exposing,
6 The French verb ’se sentir’ loses some of its meaning in translation, as the reflexive verb that refers
directly to the ‘self’ is not found in the English language.
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initiating or maintaining an activity that is nothing but this exposure or, in Agamben’s
words, “the taking place of every thing” (Agamben 1993, 15).
The question of repetition is also of importance for the purposes of this study. In his
lecture on dance cited above, Nancy does not define more closely what kind of dance he
is speaking of other than referring to it as “repetition”. Repetition of crawling, hitting,
jumping or any kind of movement corresponds here to the – in Nancy’s words –
“multiverse” that the world is. While it fits to his general arguments concerning the
otherness that a being-in-common actually is built upon, it is not certain that the repetition
has no “compass outside itself” (Nancy 2015) as he formulates it. By illustrating the
problem here with a banal example, one might see how being home alone and repeating
the same movement can indeed be an act without any other end than its own repetition.
But Nancy in fact takes it up by referring to “the rehearsal of a spectacle” (ibid.) or to
repetition as it is done when trying to memorise a poem or some other text. The spectacle
is here quite evidently a performance of some kind, and in this context ‘rehearsal’ most
often refers to the repetition of a choreography which in turn is always, quite literally, the
work of someone else. There is then a point to be clarified here; Nancy is clear in
contrasting dance to walking by stating that walking is the choreography of paces but
holds that dance is the repetition of apparently some movement that is given but still
stands as an example of an activity without “compass outside itself” (ibid.).
What Nancy perhaps talks about reminds more of specific dance forms such as salsa,
tango or any kind of dance that is part of a ritual of some kind, perhaps in the way a
number of anthropologists have described in their description of remote communities or
anyway in some context where there is a tradition of a certain kind of movement – in any
of these registers of movement the exposure to otherness would open up and trigger the
“return”. This is however not the ultimate point of discussion here. The perhaps more
important point is the meaning of a repetition that according to Nancy is itself the
examination of the same being each time “as if it was for the first time” (Nancy 2015);
for seeing something each time with new eyes means there is something spontaneous, or
at least not controlled by some “exterior calculus” (ibid.). This is where the question of
improvisation and choreography (or some outer formula) is outlined. There is similarly a
few aspects in Badiou’s conception of dance that point towards the same issue – this is
further developed in the next section.
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4.3 Alain Badiou
For Alain Badiou, being can be understood in mathematical terms (see Badiou 2005a). In
stating that “there is” a count is conducted; this count is a presentation, a sort of structure
that makes being conceivable. It follows quite naturally that if the count is one, the
presentation that is the result of it is necessarily multiple: “The count-as-one is no more
than the system of conditions through which the multiple can be recognised as multiple”
(ibid, 29). What is also implicit in this view is that the one itself is not, it is “the phantom
remainder” in any presentation – this is what Badiou calls the void. In this way, the void
is “distributed everywhere” and out of this void being as multiple emerges as “a modality-
according-to-the-one of the void itself” (ibid, 53–57.). In other words, whereas the
multiple is the structure of the presentation, the proper name of being itself is the void.
This non-presentation is at the core of the “evental site” (ibid, 174 –175); events are to be
understood as names given to things, places, happenings and so on. Whenever we spot
‘events’ we become related to them as subjects – outside these ruptures that can be given
names there is no subjectivity, only the void set out of which being as multiple then
emerges.
For Badiou, philosophy is not in a position of being the sole creator of truths of being.
Instead, truth procedures can be conducted in the field of art, politics, science and love.
When speaking of art, one should thus – in a properly philosophical manner – see it as a
way of thinking through a specific kind of truth. Historically, art has been treated by
philosophy primarily according to two opposite schemata as Badiou (2005b) calls them;
the didactic and the romantic schema. The first one refers to a condemning or mistrust of
art’s capability of creating truths. For Plato, according to Badiou, art was subject to a
mistrusting inquiry because it seemed to be potentially deceptive insofar as it had the
power to create an imitation of truth, to present itself innocently as naked truth itself. This
in turn was misleading on the way to the prime Idea that could only be established
discursively; art is in this view chimera and incapable of truth, it is “the charm of a
semblance of truth”. The romantic schema, on the other hand, is in a sense a reversal of
this view as it glorifies art as the only activity capable of truth. Art is in this schema the
only educator that can bring forth the ideas of the philosopher, perhaps in a similar way
that Nancy’s dancing body is the return to the self and as such the very incarnation of
singularity as otherness (Badiou 2005b, 2–5.).
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Apart from these two schemata, Badiou defines a third one, the classical schema. This is
in short the schema of ‘liking’ – as Aristotle saw it, art might be incapable of truth, but is
in a sense harmless. Art can function as the remedy of the torments of the soul, create
beautiful images and stories that are therapeutic perhaps (Badiou 2005b, 4–5). This is in
fact very close to the modern conception of art at least in the context of state
administration. Badiou states that in the classical view art is a public service; in this sense
also the modern age is characterised as predominantly classical attitude towards the art-
truth relation. Indeed, even a brief look at the cultural policy as defined by the Ministry
of Education and Culture reveals a language of “art and cultural services”7. It is likewise
not farfetched to say that a common way of justifying the existence of art is precisely to
speak of it as a good way to relax, regain energy for everyday work etc. This is however
a question outside the scope of this study. What is of importance is Badiou’s call for a
new schema, a new way of assessing art in terms of its relation to truth – he calls this new
schema inaesthetics (Badiou 2005b). This is to say that beyond both condemning and
glorifying art there is a schema which sees art itself as a process of truth, as a thinking of
its own being as truth. Art is “in each and every one of its points the thinking of the
thought that it itself is” (ibid. 14); works of art, “points”, are fragments of the thinking-
as-art and tell truths about their own field. There are no truths that can be derived from
art and translated into some general matrix of meaning. Instead, artistic configuration is
a specific mode of thinking itself.
Dance is for Badiou a special case as a form of art. Unlike the poem, which has the power
to bring being to the point of language and thus becoming aware of the void, dance is the
very presence of being before it can even be thought. In a way then dance is what precedes
the event, it is “a visitation of the pure site”. For Badiou, dance is not technically even an
art, but rather the manifestation of a possibility for art (Badiou 2005b, 66–69.); dance
transforms the rigid body subjected to external constraints and shows what the body is
capable of. As such it is the metaphor for the undecided and unfixed thought; whereas the
‘event’ is precisely the naming of what ‘there is’, dance is what precedes this naming in
its absence of depiction. At the same time as dance shows what the body is capable of, it
also remains silent and undecided on a multiple of other choices – after all, dance is one
set of movements that cannot be this or that set of movements, it is the restraining of other
7 See Ministry of Education and Culture in Finland,
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Kulttuuri/kulttuuripolitiikka/?lang=en .
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movements. Just like “[e]very genuine instance of thinking is subtracted from the
knowledge in which it is constituted”, dance is subtracted, as it were, from itself and is
“genuine” to the extent that “she [the dancer] does not execute the dance, but is the
restrained intensity that manifests the gesture’s indecision” (Badiou 2005b, 66.).
It is clear that what Badiou is talking about is dance as principle; he states explicitly that
these principles have little to do with “dance thought in its own terms, on the basis of its
history and technique, but of dance such as it is given welcome and shelter by philosophy”
(Badiou 2005b, 62–63). Like with arts in general, Badiou holds that the specific
configuration that this or that artwork presents is not the truth of art in its infinite
multitude of possible forms:
“beyond the proper names retained as significant illustrations of the
configuration or as the “dazzling” subject points of its generic trajectory, there
is always a virtually infinite quantity of subject points [] that are no less a part
of the immanent truth whose being is provided by the artistic configuration”
(Badiou 2005b, 13)
In other words, the style, genre or a particular work of art is not independent from the
process of a truth created through art, it only exhibits the ongoing truth procedures of the
evental site, each time in a different manner. We would have to conclude then that the
specific type of dance is not of importance in terms of the artistic configuration that dance
represents. For Badiou however, dance seems to be neither the Nietzschean “spontaneous
vulgarity of the body”, nor the body as “exerted for the sake of its subjection to
choreography” (Badiou 2005b 59–63.). In other words, dance is for Badiou the emblem
of the non-name preceding the event, but simultaneously it is brought into existence by
some restraint that marks its difference from a free pulsation of the body, that is,
“vulgarity”. There is then a slight discrepancy here: dance is a truth procedure regardless
of its types of “subject points”, but still it cannot be any kind of pulsation. This implies
that the nature of the restraint immanent in this view plays a crucial role here.
This is where the question of composition versus improvisation outlined in the
introduction becomes important – can there be such an ‘ontology of dance’ without a
closer examination of types of dance? Clark (2011, 59) claims that what Badiou misses
“is simply the precise difference between dancing as such and the choreographic and
pedagogic predetermination, not merely of movement itself, but aspects of the ideational
representations of its practitioners”. Clark sees Badiou’s vision of dance, especially in the
35
light of his refusal to address the role of choreography, as a description of spontaneous
improvisation that nevertheless needs a ‘restraint’. Since the ground-breaking work of
Merce Cunningham, whose interpretation of dance was that of non-narration and absence
of content, this “‘restraint’ is precisely the subjective interpretation of, reaction to, or
collision with the externally imposed ‘grammars’ of the choreographic process” (Clark
2011, 60). This implies one important question regarding Badiou’s claim that “dance
depicts[] nothing” (Badiou 2005b, 64); according to Clark, the relation between non-
depiction and depiction is precisely illuminated by the process where the dancing body
meets the matrix of choreography, whether narrative or not; “[d]ance therefore  never
lacks representation as such but remains, immanently, in tension with representation”
(Clark 2011, 60). Dance has to, in other words, position itself in relation to a restraint,
that is, choreography.
The important point that Badiou provides us, although ironically without giving any
attention to it, is that dance is an activity that can be assessed according to what kind of a
restraint it subjects itself to. If we for a moment revisit Agamben’s (2000, 59) statement
of dance manifesting the “complete gesturality of human beings”, then it cannot be
thought of in terms of a restraint; in this case, the dance itself is the restraint, the
suspension of the means-ends axis. In this sense, there can be no choreography to speak
of – there is only dance as a manifestation of a means as such and that is all there is to it.
And if we recollect briefly Nancy’s (2015) repetitive “rehearsal” where the otherness of
the self becomes manifest, we would have to be able to show that outside this repetition
there is no external force that controls the repetition. Similarly, if we in Badiou’s terms
think of dance as the unfixed thought itself, then dance would be this unfixedness itself,
outside – precisely as Clark put it – choreographic predetermination. But in the “rehearsal
of the spectacle” (Nancy 2015) and in dance that is this or that configuration as opposed
to “vulgar pulsation” (Badiou 2005b), there has to be a restraint or an external calculus
of some kind. So what is this restraint?
Clark’s critical examination of Badiou’s conception of dance points to a relevant issue in
the depiction of dance as the praxis with no end other than itself. Although Badiou refuses
to discuss the specific meaning of the history of dance, it can easily be argued that any
kind of dance is always constrained by choreography and is therefore never purely
‘gestural’ and auto referential. In the next chapter the aim is precisely to examine more
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closely how the restraint question has featured in the field of professional dance itself and
see to what extent this might develop further the peculiar status of dance as “a return to
one self”, “the making visible of a means as such” and “the unfixed thought”.
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5 Dance as the history of representation, non-representation and
improvisation
In this chapter the aim is to present some prevalent themes that have shaped the field of
dance in a particular part of the world and examine to what extent this can shed light on
the question of dance as the paradigm of politics. The main point of departure is the birth
of modern dance in the US and its discordant relationship to the tradition of classical
ballet. The intention is not to go through with great scrutiny each detail of the history of
modern dance; rather, the task is to approach the question of dance and its relation to a
restraint of some kind not through an inescapably metaphoric use of the philosopher, but
through the work of choreographers that have processed the question of dance and
movement in unique ways.
Isadora Duncan, a dancer known both for her dislike of classical ballet and her flamboyant
and bohemian lifestyle and appearances once stated: “The school of ballet today []
produces a sterile movement which gives no birth to future movements, but dies as it is
made” (Duncan 1977). Ballet, in other words, equalled death for Isadora Duncan, a point
I return to in the last section of this chapter. Duncan was a US born dancer who lived a
colourful life in several European countries and created a unique dancing technique that
according to herself was based on successive movements that follow one another in an
organic manner. She moved to London at the end of the 19th century and toured
throughout Europe and finally died in 1927 as a Soviet citizen. She lived a then
scandalous life, having three children out of wedlock, baring her breasts at some dance
performances and spending time with for instance Mary D’Este who was a member of
Aleister Crowley’s occult order.
Duncan’s mistrust of the strict movements of classical ballet came to be by and large the
general theme of dance choreographers in the early 20th century US who sought to
distance themselves from the rigid movement vocabulary of ballet, although Isadora
Duncan is not directly linked to these developments as she was active mainly in Europe
for the latter part of her life. In this study I have chosen to look at a particular line of
development in the US by introducing the work of Martha Graham, Merce Cunningham
and Steve Paxton. Graham has said to be one of the central figures in American modern
dance – in a similar tone as Duncan, she devoted her explorations of movement to
dramatic, expressive and “nature-like” movement in contrast to the outward-projecting
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and restrained movement aesthetics of ballet. Cunningham was a dancer in the Martha
Graham Company for six years but developed later on his own dance technique, so called
choreographic formalism in close collaboration with composer John Cage. Paxton in turn
was a member of Cunningham’s own company and went on to further explore the
possibilities of improvisation and complete absence of choreography in what came to be
known as contact improvisation.
I start by a brief presentation of Martha Graham’s work in section 5.1 and continue with
a closer examination of Merce Cunningham’s choreographic techniques and views on
dance in general in section 5.2 – there are some specific aspects of Cunningham’s work
that are of importance for this study as will be shown. Likewise, Steve Paxton’s unique
project in bodily improvisation serves as a fruitful ground for studying the meaning of
improvisation in this context. Finally, I end this chapter by drawing together the main
findings of this brief historical collage by examining its meaning for the question of dance
as pure praxis.
5.1 Martha Graham and the break from classical ballet
Although Martha Graham (1894–1991) was trained in a completely different manner than
Isadora Duncan, their dance philosophies share fundamental similarities. Both
emphasised a kind of primitivism they thought was inherent in dance; they drew
inspiration from ancient myths and civilisations and dance seemed to be for both a search
for the mysteries of life and the sacredness and wisdom of the body itself. Important traits
of this was first of all a rejection of modernist values and a novel use of dramatic
expressionism in contrast to the apparent coolness of ballet. An early form of feminism
or at least an emphasis on the beauty of the female body was also to be found in the work
of both. Duncan explicitly expressed her loath of marriage and its slavish effects for
women and dancing was for her in many ways a celebration of the freed female body.
Graham was equally clear in her depictions of the female sacredness – for years her dance
company in fact welcomed female dancers only. Indeed, “Martha Graham, although she
was a pupil of St. Denis, is unimaginable without Duncan (Acocella in Duncan 2013,
xvii)8.
Graham was greatly influenced by the thoughts of John Martin, one of the earliest dance
critics and the author of the first extensive book on the birth of modern dance, The Modern
8 St. Denis refers here to The Denishawn School of Dancing and Related Arts, the first US dance academy
to produce its own company. Ruth St. Denis was one of the founders of the school.
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Dance (1933). Dance had indeed not been seen as an actual art form up until then in the
same manner as theatre or music – even in the form of ballet it was usually seen as part
and parcel of a work of music. Martin identified in modern dance a few traits that became
almost emblematic of Graham’s work; for Martin (1989[1933], 8–9) , modern dance had
rediscovered the most fundamental aspects of human life and the actual meaning of dance
that has been blocked and masked by civilisation:
“In earlier civilisations, and even to-day among primitive people, dancing is
involved in practically and important experience in the lives both of
individuals and of the people as a whole. There are dances of birth, of death,
of coming of age, of courtship and marriage, of fertility, of war and pestilence,
of casting out devils, of curing the sick. Whenever the primitive mind came
into contact with something that happened without his having anything to do
with it, something with the element of mystery and supernaturalism, he
danced.”
Early modern dance was primitivist precisely in these terms – dance was seen to invoke
the inner world of the human body, its ‘primitive’ truths and vital sources of expression,
all those forces that we supposedly lost in the emerging modern society based on
rationalist values. Needless to say, this was during the golden era of psychoanalysis and
its discoveries of the ‘unconscious’ can easily be found in Graham’s work (see e.g. Burt
1999). In fact, the citation above is almost like a direct reference to dances choreographed
by Graham, one need only look at some of the titles of her dances such as “Adolescence”
(1929), “Primitive Mysteries” (1931), “Deaths and Entrances” (1943) and “Cave of the
Heart” (1946). Graham’s work is often being referred to as abstract expressionism
precisely because in contrast to the clear storylines of ballet, her works often set out to
express the emotive states present in these themes, although it can of course be debated
to what extent they were abstract. This is however outside the scope of this study.
Martha Graham’s technique is still being taught in dance schools throughout the world
and her impact on the American field of dance is undoubtedly profound. Here her work
is mainly introduced as a point of contrast to the work of Merce Cunningham who I will
focus on in more detail in the next section. Cunningham was the first male dancer to enter
Graham’s dance company and was likewise trained in the technique of ballet. Although
one might certainly find influences of Graham in the early works of Cunningham, the
work he later became known for deviated to a great extent from that of her former teacher
and company leader.
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5.2 Merce Cunningham and formalism
In The Century (2007, 131) Badiou poses the following question: “Can we observe, within
the century, the deployment of a critique of semblance, a critique of representation,
mimesis and ‘the natural’?” This was to a great extent the project of Merce Cunningham.
Rejecting almost completely both the emotion-drenched expressionism of Graham and
the character depiction of classical ballet, Cunningham created a series of works in which
“the dancers are not pretending to be other than themselves” (Cunningham 2008). The
dramatic expressiveness was to be almost completely absent in his work and he seemed
to be occupied with the form itself, as will be discussed in this section.
One of the most radical aspects of Cunningham’s work in the eyes of the 1950’s audience
was his use, or rather non-use, of music; up until then dance had been closely tied to the
rhythmic and melodic impulses of the musical score (this was the case with Graham and
perhaps even more so with Duncan). For Cunningham, music and dance seemed to simply
occur in the same space and bore often no relation to one another. Once, when asked what
music should be doing for dance, Cunningham simply replied: “Leave it alone”
(Kostelanetz 1992, 31). In fact it appeared almost as it would have been the other way
around at times – in “Variations V” for instance the stage is surrounded by electronically
sensitive antennae that generate sounds only if the dancers come close enough to create a
flux of air that provokes them.
Another trait of Cunningham is his use of chance. Closely working with composer John
Cage, Cunningham often used deliberately deployed chance in choreography, frequently
with the help of the I Ching, an ancient Chinese book of divination. The I Ching is
comprised of sixty-four hexagrams that are formed by different combinations of trigrams
and Cunningham often worked with for example sixty-four different phrases or different
kinds of movements which he then applied randomly in certain parts of his
choreographies. There was not much mystery though for Cunningham in his use of it,
rather he used it more as a technique of creating choreographies – instead of choosing
what kind of movements a certain section would include, he consulted the I Ching to
make the choice for him. This way, of course, each performance of the same
choreography would appear different. Copeland (2004, 110–111) argues that the use of
chance represented a kind of suspicion of the “natural” spontaneity of human movement
that was so emblematic of Graham – using chance as method (a paradox in terms) was a
way to reach beyond the self and personal inclinations or tastes. Tomkins (1974)
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interpreted in a similar manner Cunningham and Cage’s use of chance in choreography
and composition as a possibility to “outdistance the self entirely [] and to get into a new
field of awareness in which every part of the terrain was unfamiliar”. This passage
resonates partly with Nancy’s idea of an inoperative community where familiarity in the
form of a predetermined destiny is abandoned. These resonances are even stronger in
some thoughts and writings of John Cage, the musical director of the Cunningham Dance
Company. When asked by biologist C.H. Waddington whether more unity should be
created in modern society, he replied that he would rather have “open-ness”, in particular
towards “things with which I am unfamiliar. I think that in society the stranger has always
had a great integrating effect” (Cage in Copeland 2004, 143.).
The stage setting itself was often decentralized to distort the perceptual experience of a
dance performance. Dancers would be doing a duet here, a solo there, often in the midst
of some peculiar décor such as Andy Warhol’s floating silver pillows or Robert
Rauschenberg’s random-looking sets with lace and hanging silver mirrors. Apart from
obviously bringing different art forms together in a unique way, Cunningham also
exercised in this way his own vision of dance as something that simply takes place among
other things and represents nothing besides itself – dance, music and stage décor were in
fact created most often in isolation from one another and brought together just before the
performance. Dancing was for him “a visible action of life”, not in the sense that it would
have revealed some hidden passions of the soul but because it simply happens: “it seems
enough that dancing is a spiritual exercise in physical form, and that what is seen, is what
it is” (Cunningham 1952). This is one of the reasons for taking up Cunningham’s work
in the context of this study – to draw attention to Cunningham’s endless interest in
movement itself, its infinite possibilities of combinations and above all its autonomy in
relation to music or exterior narratives. One of Cunningham’s earliest critics, Jill Jonston,
expressed the following after a performance in 1963:
“Each movement means only itself and it moves you by its pure existence, by
being so much itself. It is Cunningham’s magic as a performer to make every
action a unique and complete experience. The gesture is the performer; the
performer is the gesture.”
It is as if the movement’s possibility of being nothing besides itself – one of the chief
concerns politically as outlined so far – would have become visible in the work of
Cunningham. Space is of great importance here. Just as Badiou asserted that dance is the
only art primarily dependant on space and presents itself as “a visitation of the pure site”
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(Badiou 2005b, 66), Cunningham saw the importance of space in dance. First of all, he
refused to use the stage in the classical way of opening the stage in one direction (that of
the audience) and instead saw the stage as open to several directions. But perhaps more
importantly, he seemed to use the time length of a performance as space itself, a kind of
structure that would install a formal space within which both dance and music could take
place in literally any kind of arrangements:
“Now time can be an awful lot of bother with the ordinary pinch-penny
counting that has to go on with it, but if one can think of the structure as a
space of time in which anything can happen in any sequence of movement
event, and any length of stillness can take place, then the counting is an aid
towards freedom, rather than a discipline towards mechanization”
(Cunningham, 1952)
Interestingly, the time structure is itself what creates a space for possible freedom – by
working with time as a strict formal structure, any movement but also any length of
stillness can take place. Of course, at this stage one needs to be reminded of the fact that
Cunningham did not create works of great spontaneity in the sense that his dancers would
have been free to move in whatever way they wanted, with the exception of course of
sequences where the dancers could make their choice from a particular set of movements.
On the contrary, his choreographies demanded highly skilled dancers with almost
virtuosic technique; especially perhaps the randomly created sections would result in
movement shifts that were certainly not “organic” or “natural” for the body. His work had
in this sense nothing to do with improvisation, rather his unique project lay in freeing
dance from an outer narrative. If Martha Graham’s project was that of expressing the
inside rather than the outside, Cunningham installed a space of movement exploration in
place of expression itself, nevertheless guided by his own mastermind of a choreographer.
In the light of the question of a restraint that was raised in the previous chapter, it might
be noted that as far as dance is concerned, it seems that the question of whether dance has
a “compass outside itself” (Nancy 2015) can be approached in seemingly varying ways.
In the next section the aim is to examine the term ‘improvisation’ in a very particular
context. Again, it is not all-encompassing in any way, but is presented here as a way of
assessing the meaning of choreography or rather the absence of it. After discussing Steve
Paxton, a former dancer in the Cunningham Company, the main conclusions of this brief
historical recollection are drawn together in the last section.
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5.3 Steve Paxton and contact improvisation
Steve Paxton (1939–) was well acquainted with both the more expressive forms of
modern dance and with Cunningham’s innovative, though for many disturbing, style. He
trained one year with José Limón, a choreographer known for his dramatic dance
performances that in a way represented abstract expressionism at its most mature stage,
and three years with Merce Cunningham. Well-drenched in the 1960’s avant-garde circles
he developed an improvisational dance form during the 1970’s that would be called
contact improvisation.
Contact improvisation is essentially about exploring any kind of movements possible for
the body and what happens to this multitude of possibilities in contact with other bodies.
Typically it would include rolling on the floor on top of each other, lifts and even jumps
against each other. Instead of trying to create a unique movement style of his own, Paxton
seemed to be interested in including all possible human movements in his improvisation.
He saw most dance forms as obsessed with the technical project of creating a certain kind
of movement vocabulary – this was not only the case with classical ballet, but with dance
traditions in general:
 “[O]ur ordinary movement has so many little micromovements of potential
in all directions. We’re like a big, overly cooked soup of potential, and
[dancing] classes are a way of straining that soup and getting down to just the
carrots or just the rutabagas and making something of that. That’s
composition, right?” (Paxton 2009)
Of course, we saw that also for Cunningham a maximum inclusion of a wide spectre of
movements was of crucial importance – in Variations V he entered the stage on a bicycle
at the end of the show. But contact improvisation was non-performative from the outset;
although Paxton also performed as a dancer and made choreographies, contact
improvisation stayed in training halls and remained a kind of experimental laboratory of
movement.
In contrast to many other dancers and choreographers of his time, Paxton was also
interested in creating movement together with non-professional dancers. Perhaps this is
one reason why he movement-wise also started from the very basics, namely walking:
“[g]oing towards inclusion was my aim. Before I did this, I did ten years of walking
dances” (Paxton 2009). This way he dedicated years for the study of the tiniest
movements of the spine, the sheer sensation of walking and the process of moving itself.
In contrast to Cunningham, he did not want his students to perform this or that movement:
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“What I’m teaching is just to get people to look at what’s happening. Modern
dance got off looking at what’s happening in culture or history, or at
relationships between men and women. It was a good art form. But if I were
to be true to that idea of evolving, then I would have to ask some new
questions. So my question was walking, and my answer is . . . walking.”
(Paxton 2012)
We see another configuration of the “issue” of a restraint here; for Paxton, the project was
one of freeing movement not only from representation and exterior narratives, but of
choreography altogether. There was of course some material that Paxton used for his
explorations – lifts for instance were not done in any random way but rather his aim was
to see in which way bodies might find their balance when bounced against each other.
And it doesn’t require much attention to realise that these sometimes acrobatic-looking
movements were built on a solid movement background acquired elsewhere; indeed, the
original name of contact improvisation was art sport. However, what is of interest in the
context of this study is Paxton’s insistence on focusing on movement-only to the extent
that it did not even need an audience in the conventional meaning. Is it not here we in a
sense find “complete gesturality” (Agamben 2000) of human movement, of gestures that
are simply there and cannot be separated from their form?  Or perhaps it is more a question
of a kind of profanation of ‘sacred’ movements that are so rigidly upheld by the dogma
of not only classical ballet, but of numerous other dance forms as well. It is in the space
that opens itself between ordinary, everyday movement (walking) and the far-driven
specialised composition of the professional dance that it is possible to create movement
that does not aim at anything else than the restoration of a multitude of potentialities. In
any case Paxton’s understanding of human movement brings us perhaps closest to the
idea of movement that is capable of its own non-functional being precisely because its
design is not controlled even by a choreographer.
5.4 What is improvisation?
In the light of Martha Graham, Merce Cunningham and Steve Paxton we can get a
glimpse of at least three formulations of how the question of a restraint can be processed.
One concerns the question of narrative in a dance piece; Graham can said to have replaced
the need of a storyline with the abstract expression of an emotive state (although it can of
course be debated to what extent Grahams work really was abstract). The second
formulation of the restraint issue is presented by the work of Cunningham; here we find
a replacement of representation with dance itself, albeit as the product of a choreographer.
Finally, the third version is that of Paxton’s improvisation where dance is autonomous to
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both expression and choreography. We can perhaps conceptualise these three
formulations as representation, non-representation and improvisation. Although this is in
no way a dance-historical point to be developed in depth in this study, its main function
here is – as outlined in the beginning of this chapter – to point out that in order for one to
be able to speak of dance as movement for its own sake, we need to clear out what is
actually meant by dance and to what extent it comes into being as a relation to some
extraneous force. We need not abandon the above mentioned philosophers’ conception
of dance; rather, the task will be to clarify the contents of their definition. In an
exaggerated version any kind of spontaneous movement is political because it exemplifies
a sphere of gestures and mediality; in this case dance as a concept is irrelevant, or at least
marginal or misplaced – we could instead simply speak of ‘movement’ or ‘gesture’.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, classical ballet has offered a key point of
reference to many dancers and choreographers that are seen to belong to the era of modern
dance. Isadora Duncan labelled ballet the death of natural movement and went as far as
calling its movements ugly (Duncan 2013 [1927], 13). Steven Paxton saw it as one of the
extreme forms of exclusion and image-projection – to a large extent, this is indeed what
ballet is about, creating beautiful images. However, there is another aspect of ballet that
can be viewed from a slightly different angle. A contemporary dancer I worked with
recently described in passing how she simply loves ballet for its clarity – “there is so
much space to breath in ballet, the movements are strict but so airy you really can focus
on your breath”. Similarly, ballet dancer Maria Baranova expressed in an interview –
along with explaining how she wanted her movement to reach perfection – that the best
part of dancing ballet is its unpredictability, the not knowing where the movement takes
you (Helsingin Sanomat, 8 July 2015). Interestingly then, even in presumably one of the
strictest forms of movement vocabulary a possible margin of freedom can be experienced.
Just as Cunningham (1952) could see a strict time structure as an “aid towards freedom,
rather than a discipline towards mechanization” as cited above, it seems that ballet can
also offer a clear frame within which a certain degree of freedom can be perceived,
although one will certainly find contemporary dancers that disagree on this point.
Improvisation can generally be understood as lack of choreography, a point already
discussed in the introduction of this study. Most often, however, there is some underlying
structure that guides the improvisation; for instance, it can be decided that a certain
selection of movements can be used in improvising or even in completely free
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improvisation there is at the very least a time frame for how long the improvising will
take place. When addressing improvisation in the context of this study, I then view it
precisely as a relation to choreography or an outer restraint – the task is to find out to
what extent it is possible to speak of spontaneous and unrestrained movement in the case
of dance in general and Katulavatanssit in particular. This in turn is used to sort out what
the political implications of this relation are. In the following chapter, the question of
improvisation versus choreography is wrapped up by revisiting the KLT case and steering
the trajectory of this study back to a more conventional understanding of politics.
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6 Katulavatanssit – (relatively) unstructured dance and its relation
to dance as political
The Katulavatanssit case was presented in the first chapter through a brief description of
a few themes prevalent in the earlier acquired material. Two important themes were
according to many participants improvisation or “free movement” and the feeling of
creating a mutual space of playing together. In addition, the question of the KLT case
becoming a convention of its own, as brought up by a few respondents, was presented
and left open for further examination.
The main motivation for gathering further material in the form of interviews is directly
linked to the “restraint issue” dwelled upon in the previous chapter. In order to shed some
more light on the political status of dance I wanted to first of all define more precisely in
which way KLT can be seen as improvised and spontaneous. Secondly and closely
connected to the general question of improvisation, I was interested to find out in more
detail to what extent it displays certain traits that could be described as choreography; the
main question here is that if KLT can be seen as having developed certain movement
conventions through the years, they might perhaps be called choreographies. In any case,
the main idea in this chapter is to explore the question of choreography versus
improvisation in the context of KLT, define in which ways it reflects some questions
already brought up by presenting the work of Cunningham and Paxton, and finally to
open up the field of concluding in which way the choreography-improvisation question
shapes the conception of dance as political. Consequently, I chose to interview five KLT
participants on the basis of the questionnaire material precisely because, all these
respondents mentioned or brought up in some way – not necessarily using a negative tone
– the tendency of KLT creating its own movement vocabulary. Apart from these
interviewees deliberately chosen for the purposes of my particular interest in
improvisation (or its limits), I did two additional interviews: one with a dance student
from the Theatre Academy in Helsinki and another with a dancer currently working at the
National Opera of Finland. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, some comments
of the former spurred a special interest in some aspects of ballet, as will be analysed more
closely in this chapter. The reason behind interviewing the latter have to do with a few
interesting comments on working with different kinds of choreographers – these are
examined in the last section of this chapter.
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Altogether the interviews followed a rather open structure guided by the general theme
of improvisation and choreography. This theme was modelled upon the following
questions guiding the interview: what is the meaning of improvisation in the context of
KLT; in what way can certain movement conventions be detected in KLT and how could
they be avoided; what is the role of music and is there something that might be called
choreography? The role of music was intended to be of special importance when
interviewing the main organiser of the event concept, but turned out to be an important
question in general because the playlist is one of the most formal frames guiding the dance
concept.
One last aspect that was briefly mentioned in the first chapter presenting KLT is therapy;
many respondents of the questionnaire described their dancing experience as therapeutic
in some way. Intrigued by the meaning of this “therapy dimension” and its potential
meaning to a study in politics, I included the question in my interviews. This aspect will
be briefly examined at the end of this chapter.
6.1 To dance and not
“All ways of dancing and being are correct” is one of the ways in which Katulavatanssit
is described by the organiser. I set out to explore what this sentence or the word
improvisation in this context means for the interviewees. One participant (Interviewee 4),
a professional musician who has participated in the event concept since its beginning,
replied instantly:
“If I see someone dancing in a particular way, I don’t have to dance in that
way and if I have some view on and idea of for example a musical style that
I hear from the amplifier, then ok I dance to that style”
She added that as her own dancing background is mainly in couple dancing, she often
quite automatically starts moving in that way and finds dance partners with perhaps
similar backgrounds. On the other hand, she felt that there is always the possibility of not
following the typical rules of couple dancing: “it is permitted that I don’t have to do that
and on the other hand [] if I get that impulse I can do that”. She also added later on that
there is in fact the “freedom not to choose anything at all”, because often people might
just walk for a while, engage in a talk with a dance partner or simply not be part of the
show by means of dancing. This illuminates in a way one typical aspect of KLT – there
is no general rule of what should happen during the two hours’ trip. But another important
thing these answers point out is that this “freedom” does not mean that each participant
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would be doing some sort of random movement all along; quite the contrary, they often
tend to draw their movement inspiration from previously learned techniques. But the
freedom to make the choice is simply the main thing that stands in contrast to many other
contexts of dance, as already noted on the basis of the questionnaire responses.
Music is of course one strong guideline in the context of KLT – for many it seems to
facilitate the dancing simply because “dancing with music is anyway more familiar to
people” (Interviewee 5); it’s not any kind of noise but “everyone knows in this kind of
human context what music is” (Interviewee 1) and in this way it makes it easier to start
the dancing both within the group and with strangers. This is in turn closely connected to
the question of improvisation; the main organiser stated that “in practice it’s quite difficult
to say to people that [] go to the city space and improvise”. So in this case the music
provides the frame, the familiar element upon which the free part is modelled, or
improvised. In addition, it can differ how free improvisation is; the musician with a couple
dance background cited above – perhaps her experience in improvisation in general in the
form of music is reflected in her view – expressed that in fact for her, the word
improvisation often implies the existence of some sort of rules:
“I think there are levels (laughs) and what is it in the context of
Katulavatanssit, well it’s very free, it’s maybe the freest of the freest [] It often
happens in Katulavatanssit that people just walk for some time or say hello to
each other, in a way stop what you might think is happening, [] so it doesn’t
have to be actualised all the time, the movement improvisation, but it can also
breathe and pause”
In a similar manner, another participant (Interviewee 5) stated that “if at some point the
way you are is not dance, then that’s fine too”. The main organiser also perceived of the
word improvisation more like a suggestion of what might happen:
“Its meaning is not to describe it, what the doing in the streets eventually is,
it’s not a definition for that now we’re doing or this what we’re doing is free
dance, I think it’s more of a conceptual frame for that you can define that
yourself”
This might imply at least two additional things. One concerns the fact that what you
decide to do in the spur of the moment might not be improvised in the sense that you often
do some movement you’ve already learned – in this case it is more of a reaction than any
kind of spontaneously initiated movement. Indeed, for one interviewee (Interviewee 3)
improvisation implies only that it happens in the moment and despite this it can of course
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be “norm-based or learnt or then it comes from the inside”. The other point is that taking
the space as free and doing what you choose within it might actually require quite a lot of
courage and charisma – in this case one might even call it a power play in kind. It is not
perhaps easy to posit yourself within the group and dance in a way you can define yourself.
One interviewee, an experienced dancer in many genres, described how some people
seem to have more leadership qualities than others, or simply more experience of dancing
in the streets or dancing in general which makes them examples to follow for new
participants. In this sense it is not always a completely free space although the possibility
for it is provided: “There is space we’re willing to provide, would you take it…it just
needs more encouragement for the less established members” (Interviewee 2).
If there are to begin with differences between skills and even personal qualities, and if on
the other hand the space itself invites participants to create something that can be called
choreographies, the question is naturally what could be done to avoid or escape it. “It’s a
bit difficult in a way unless we keep on having this new blood that’s becoming more
active, promoting their approach” (Interviewee 2). The important point is that new
members who join present their own approach – not any kind of random being, but a
deliberately chosen way of being. Of course the difference compared to other contexts
where one needs to define a clear identity and stick to it, in KLT one is free to choose
between different approaches and restrain from pursuing any one of them, as already
outlined.
I will return to the theme of leadership and what it means in the context of KLT in section
6.4. Before that the aim is to approach improvisation – if we consider improvisation itself
a way of approaching the possible “gesturality” of dance in general – from the viewpoint
of its apparent opposite: choreography.
6.2 Choreographies arising from a space of freedom
We already saw in the first section that the previous dancing background of each
participant is naturally reflected in how the dancing finally looks like in the streets – this
is rather obvious and needs as such no in-depth analysis. But what is of relevance here is
that sometimes what is created in the moment or anyway completely free of anyone telling
you what to do or how to move becomes in a way choreography. This can happen through
a kind of reversal of the freedom space: the space of “open imagination” (Interviewee 2)
in fact invites people to promote their own ideas and movement styles that in a sense
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become choreographies, especially when perceived from the outside. It often happens for
instance that someone starts creating a circle, leading a certain movement in it or “some
cool street element is found and suddenly many people attack it and [] start inventing
some movement” (Interviewee 4). Sometimes this might be initiated by the experience of
improvisation itself – when something is open it is actually a bit challenging and thus
“you try to somehow to stay alive [], to control the thing” (Interviewee 1).
The question of whether there is something that might be called choreography in KLT
was a challenging question for one interviewee in particular. However, she brought up
twice a rather interesting notion on how being familiar with the concept alters your
experience in a seemingly paradoxical way. She described how being familiar with the
concept and having participated a few times enabled her to find her place in the group
and think of “how to be and do and then I felt quite free” (Interviewee 3). But at the same
time it was precisely this own way of being that had also created feelings of boredom and
of less spontaneity than when participating as a new member. If we translate familiarity
and unfamiliarity to choreography and improvisation, we can then perhaps conclude that
both tensions run in the field created by KLT; just like Cunningham played with a strict
time structure that created a space during which “any length of stillness can take place”
(Cunningham 1952), both aspects can be found in KLT. In this case the line is drawn in
a place where it is perhaps accessible for the maximum amount of people – it says, come
as you are and do what you want to do, but after that you have the responsibility. It is not
about controlling what kind of movement should take place, which would be one of the
most conspicuous traits of for instance Cunningham’s work. Neither is it about making a
statement in terms of whether it should be performative or not – this is where Paxton in a
sense drew his line apart from promoting a maximum spectre of movement. In KLT, there
is always the possibility of making up a performance, although it is not its original aim.
Perhaps one could say that the music is in fact what controls it to the greatest extent, it is
the material that participants use in the movement they choose; this can of course
sometimes be reaction rather than improvisation, or “movement slash music
interpretation or visualisation” (Interviewee 2). In any case, and despite the fact that some
particular movement conventions can be detected, there is always the possibility of
restraining from it:
“Sometimes it can be that I’m a bit tired (laughs) and it feels that today I’m
maybe not up for this particular choreography, but then I’ve maybe permitted
52
myself that now I’m not part of these parts of this story and this dance”
(Interviewee 4)
Saying no then in fact becomes the choreography. The question is of course whether there
is such a thing as complete improvisation: “maybe that could be it that a car comes and if
you don’t react now, you’re going to be run down by it, so that’s pretty close to pure
improvisation (laughs)” (Interviewee 1). Perhaps this is precisely what “philosophy has
yet to think of” (Nancy 1992) or a community that is to come. But then the even more
important question would concern the use of the term ‘dance’ in general, as already
mentioned in the previous chapter. It seems that the inoperative community or Agamben’s
“land of the magi who speak in gestures alone”(Agamben 2007, 22) would require no
signifying at all – in this case there would be no dance, no politics, nothing besides
gestures. But if we want to speak of politics, we must establish some conceptual field
where it becomes intelligible. Or then we do not need to abandon the project of searching
for complete gesturality (or improvisation) but rather use the thought of both pure
improvisation and pure choreography as a means of conceptualising or even conceiving
of a politics.
6.3 Leadership and authority
As mentioned in section 6.1, a few notions on the role of leadership qualities acquires
attention in the context of studying how dance can be seen as political, although it was
not something I had planned to discuss with the interviewees. Leadership can be
understood at least in two ways in this context: there is a main organiser of the event who
creates the playlist and this of course makes him a leader, and on the other hand there can
be detected within the group some differences in how the city space is utilised. Regarding
the former it might be said that the main organiser creates the choreography which is
minimal in the sense that it allows people to create their own movement styles; he is “in
a way his own master [in that space]” and the fact that “he has written out that your own
kind of being is allowed” (Interviewee 4) sets the tone for the whole event concept. But
as already pointed out earlier, this does not necessarily mean that the space that opens up
as people dance in the streets is free: various kinds of assumptions that guide people,
whether they be triggered by a piece of music or by their own tastes and values, need to
be confronted somehow and given some value when trying to initiate a being-otherwise:
“[The new space] needs to be created somehow, you need to dissemble the
rules in the space in question and then present new rules and only after that
start playing with them, of course [in KLT] all that can happen in one so the
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dissembling of the rules in the space is actually at the same time that doing
otherwise” (Interviewee 1)
This corresponds with the already mentioned fact that saying no becomes in a way the
leading choreography. But there is another aspect that has to do with the encouraging of
new members that another interviewee brought up, emphasizing the need of encouraging
new participants and staying open to their suggestions. Dissembling the rules, or a
particular way of being, is not necessarily always an easy task; in this sense it is “a
marketplace for movement styles and philosophies” as mentioned in the first chapter of
this study and elaborated further by the same respondent:
“That’s pretty much [how] the marketplace should work [], if one idea
becomes obsolete there should be some other ready to take its place, but
unless the one that’s promoting it feels comfortable about speaking it up,
about dancing it up, moving it up, how would [the others] notice”
(Interviewee 2)
The space created through and during a KLT event is then open but not without tension
– in order to create your own playground you need to step over a threshold in kind, you
need to dissemble something to be able to present “a new approach”. In this sense, as
Arendt described, we can never control what happens in the space of appearance precisely
because we cannot control who acts and in what way; and perhaps needless to mention,
it can certainly not be expected that what comes out of it is equally fair or encouraging
for everyone. On a general level, one can also find resonances of this in the typical jargon
of politics being a puppet of the market or corporate interests – this might be the case
precisely because the political sphere itself inaugurates or is the manifestation of this type
of tendencies. I will return to this aspect in the following chapter.
6.4 Therapy?
Intrigued by the meaning of “therapy” in the context of KLT, I asked each interviewee
what it meant for them. To some extent it seemed to resonate with the general thought of
being permitted to be otherwise in the city environment; as in the earlier gathered
questionnaire material, the movement without “a typical function” was described as
therapeutic in these interviews:
“All the people around you are out shopping or doing something rational and
something that has to do with the consumer society, so that you can get out
of that and dance [], that’s somehow hopeful (laughs), it’s like...that there are
other possibilities of being in places” (Interviewee 5)
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Another way to approach this was to bring up the fact that in KLT very often you do not
even know the names of people you dance with, you do not attach them to any other
identity outside the dancing context:
“It’s like hey yeah [you’re carrying your] identity in your clothing but at least
at this moment, this present time, let’s walk together []…I guess for many
people it’s a therapy” (Interviewee 2)
The word “therapy” is then not necessarily connected only to a personal project of some
kind, of processing an individual trauma, but rather a way of approaching other people in
a way that might be challenging in terms of courage but at the same time does not require
any specific kind of being. One important aspect here is of course the fact that this
interaction is being seen by other people – it naturally does not happen in isolation from
the rest of the world. And most importantly “the society and the world do not only see it
but see it in a good way” and the being-otherwise “is not only allowed but it is even
encouraged and seen as a value” (Interviewee 1). This is finally one aspect that connects
KLT firmly to the question of an Arendtian space of politics in which “men, not Man”
(Arendt 1998, 7) come together in the form of mutual action. And although certain power
structures might arise in the sense that some are more experienced than others, everyone
has the potential to activate their political mode, to find their “hidden power of expression”
(Interviewee 3).
6.5 Improvisation-choreography relation
It was briefly mentioned at the end of chapter 5 that although classical ballet can in many
ways be described as the ultimate form of choreography and outward projection, it can
interestingly be approached in a different manner. For a dance student from the Theatre
Academy of Helsinki, it is the form itself that offers a possibility for experiencing a
certain degree of freedom:
“It’s true that ballet has its forms, but those forms are very personal in a way
[…] although they are predetermined, there’s still some kind of a loose
relationship between you and that form […] works of ballet are usually done
by creating fantasy figures, like that the ballerina is very light, so within that
figure you can be free, but of course it’s not allowed to break that figure itself”
(Interviewee 6)
It remains a question whether the world created in a work of ballet is indeed just a fantasy,
a utopia within which one can through an imaginative role find something that resembles
freedom, or if the form or the role figure is in fact the restraint which even makes a
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freedom conceivable. In the latter case, ballet would not be the exemplary case of the
restraint at its extreme in any absolute sense, only the freedom/restraint question would
be formulated in a different manner in its context. And certainly, extreme workings of
choreography can also be found outside ballet – another dancer I briefly interviewed due
to his interesting notions on working with choreographers stated the following:
“There are some [choreographers] who give very much space and others who
give no space at all, at its worst it’s been like that all my movements, face
expressions, gestures, the rhythm of my breath, it’s controlled so that there’s
nothing more decided by me, given by me, I’m transformed completely into
that persons material that they try to mould and then they’re unsatisfied when
it doesn’t work or doesn’t become what they want” (Interviewee 7)
The interesting aspect of this view is highlighted when examined through Arendt’s
definition of homo faber – the dancer can (perhaps in the worst case) become the mere
material of the human artifice which in this case takes the form of a choreographed piece
of dance. Just like Arendt held that all fabrication acquires the killing of nature in order
to make the world by for instance cutting a tree to make a table, the dancer’s body is
transformed into a pile of material out of which a work of art can be created. Put more
dramatically, the extreme version of choreography is the death of everything that could
possibly arise from the dancer’s own interpretations – this is perhaps what is reflected in
Isadora Duncan’s conviction of ballet being the death of movement. But perhaps even
more intriguingly, even improvisation can be understood in terms of a similar template;
as already cited elsewhere, one of the interviewees reckoned that maybe dancing in the
streets so freely that you would eventually be hit by a car due to complete ignorance
towards an outside world would be an example of complete improvisation. This is of
course only one quotidian comment, but similar resonances can also be found in the work
of Nancy. For Nancy, the dancer arrives at the border of singularity and she finds there
not only the pulsation of plurality, but plurality that is based on death – death is the only
real ‘community’, in witnessing the death of others we become aware of this one
commonplace we all share.
Let us revisit for a moment Arendt’s view on the need of controlling the “necessities of
life”. For Arendt it was clear that the way to gain access to the political sphere required
that the toils of biological life be controlled in some way – in ancient Greece slaves took
on this life function. However conservative or unreflective with regards to justice this
view might be, an interesting aspect in the context of this study is on the one hand the
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relation between the ruler and the ruled prevalent in the household, and on the other hand
the sphere of free men where equals can come together. If we translate the rule of the
household and the free space of acting men into dance, these can be seen as exact
correlates of choreography and improvisation. The household is characterised by mastery,
which is only to say it is a typical form of strict choreography. The polis life in turn knows
no relations of this kind and can for this reason not control the actions that arise from it –
its main characteristic is unpredictability and in this sense it bears the closest resemblance
of improvisation. The household was not part of politics for Arendt, but in any case
ridding oneself of it was a precondition for partaking in the polis life. In this way, the life
of the animal laborans is itself guided by choreography and the life of the man of action
is in turn established in relation to this choreography.
In conclusion, there is always some form of restraint – minimal as in the case of KLT or
maximal as in the case of ballet – and improvisation is created in relation to it. Whatever
the type of dance is, there is always a choreography-improvisation relation, although
formulated in different ways. In other words, both choreography and improvisation are
present in the field of dance: choreography sets the order and improvisation seeks to
escape it and find some degree of freedom. One might of course argue that in this way
and perhaps a bit paradoxically, new orders – that is, choreographies – can potentially
arise as the result of improvisation. But the importance of the KLT case lies in the
capability of showing that although these new choreographies are bound to arise, they
stay open for constant reformulation and never gain full control of the concept. In this
way, both choreography and improvisation are retained and neither become the state of
the art. In this sense KLT also highlights an important aspect of Agamben’s idea of
potentiality – our great “abyss” of not-being does not simply refer to absence of activity,
but rather to the type of activity that can at any point of its practice withdraw, change its
course and be otherwise. The paradigm that dance represents is then brought into being
by two simultaneous forces, choreography and improvisation, and these form a bipolar
paradigm where two tensions are always present. Where there is only choreography or
only improvisation, dance is equally lost and cannot make itself intelligible. If we in turn
use the dance paradigm to inspect politics, we should be able to define to what degree or
in what way there is a possibility to be otherwise in the chosen object of study, in other
words, how much room there is for improvisation. What the implications of this bipolar
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paradigm are to a more conventional understanding of politics is explicated more
thoroughly in the following chapter where I answer the last research question.
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7 Conclusions – dance as the paradigm of politics and its meaning
to conventional politics
I began this study by presenting politics as praxis, a space of means that opens up when
people act together. Presenting a very classical definition of politics, namely that of
Hannah Arendt, I laid ground for a closer inspection of the nature of this sphere of pure
means by reviewing the way in which dance is perceived by Agamben, Nancy and Badiou.
On the basis of these theorists a more nuanced picture of what dance as a praxis is capable
of bringing into light was depicted; in these readings, dance can be seen as gesturality,
mediality and an unfixedness that precedes or somehow transcends the general matrix of
the modern society. These views however brought the examination of dance to the limits
of this fantasy world where dance represents an activity completely autonomous to
extraneous forces. A particular question presenting itself at this ‘limit’ was that of
choreography and improvisation; to explore the meaning of these concepts and their
usefulness to this study, I collected a few fragments from the history of modern dance in
the US to highlight some important aspects. Furthermore, the choreography-
improvisation question was extended to the field of the chosen case for this study that
was revisited in the previous chapter. The particular aim was to investigate where the line
of freedom is drawn in the KLT case and what its implications are to a discussion on
politics.
In this chapter, the lines presented above are drawn together to answer the research
questions presented in the introduction. The first two, concerning the way in which 1)
dance can be understood as the paradigm of politics and 2) how this conception is
reshaped by the difference between improvisation and choreography, have so far been
touched upon in the very formulation of the theoretical and dance-historical framework.
However, in the next section (7.1) the aim is to assemble these different notions and
present them in a more concise form. Further, by answering the final research question in
the final section (7.2) this construction of a ‘paradigm’ is itself used as a lens through
which a more conventional understanding of politics can be viewed. This can of course
be approached in different ways as there is no conventional understanding of politics set
in stone; ‘normal politics’ can be understood as a general public opinion on what politics
is or we might approach it through certain fields and interests in the whole spectre of
political research. In this study I stay mainly within the field of political research and take
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into consideration a few central aspects of the representative government as an
institutional arrangement.
7.1 Dance as the paradigm of politics
As already outlined in the first research question itself, politics is understood in this study
as praxis, as an ongoing activity that is established between humans acting together.
Although Arendt did not classify dance as political, she utilised it at times to describe
how the product of politics is embedded in the process itself. Using the idea of praxis as
a starting point for this study, dance was brought to the centre of this conception and in
this way formulated as political; in terms of movement, dance corresponds exactly with
the kind of activity where the destination is embedded in the movement itself. Another
important aspect that follows directly from an Arendtian conception of plurality as the
condition for action is the fact that the deeds that arise from the sphere of politics are
never done in isolation. This is one feature that connects the KLT case to the Arendtian
view quite naturally – as mentioned by one of the interviewees, “the whole world” is
witnessing the dancing in the streets.
The conceptual field of praxis was approached by exploring the specific status that dance
holds in the thought of Agamben, Nancy and Badiou. For Agamben, dance is the
manifestation of a movement’s capability to expose an activity that seems to be both
operative and inoperative; dance is movement, but at the same time its function as a
movement towards an end is rendered inoperative. For Nancy, dance is capable of
bringing the dancer, as it were, to the point of singularity only to discover that the ‘outside’
is nothing but the constant exposure to otherness. Dance points to a self which is simply
the singular being that occupies a place in the kind of “multiverse” (Nancy 2015) that the
world is, not a fixed identity. In this sense dance is ‘authentic’ for Nancy – it is the
rhythmic repetition that oscillates between singularity and plurality and in this way
becomes aware of the absolute plurality of being without a certain destiny. For Badiou in
turn dance is what precedes the evental site; if Agamben and Nancy seem to be more
connected to dance as an actual activity that makes a political mode of being visible, for
Badiou (2005b) dance is clearly a metaphor for “the unfixed thought”. However, to some
degree all three thinkers above seem to operate with the concept of dance as a kind of
image of a dream world of politics beyond power apparatuses. For as mentioned in the
introduction and examined more closely in chapter 5, the moment we exit the mind of the
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philosopher and introduce the theme of choreography into the discussion of dance as
movement-for-its-own-sake, it takes a slightly different shape.
Taking into consideration the aforementioned ambiguity regarding the autonomy of dance,
the second research question was formulated upon the need of identifying the meaning of
choreography and improvisation to dance and in turn assess its meaning to the praxis view
on politics. In the light of the work of Graham, Cunningham and Paxton it is apparent
that the relation between choreography versus improvisation can be formulated in
seemingly different ways in the actual world of dance. Cunningham for instance operated
with a strict form in terms of performance length and movement sets, using them to free
his dance from narrative and meaningful stage décor. In KLT the movement vocabulary
of the participants is uncontrolled to such a degree that it is not even relevant to determine
whether it might be seen as a performance or not or whether elsewhere acquired
movements are allowed or not, since eventually both are possible. But even in the case of
KLT we find a minimal restraint in the form of music and a set time for the events. And
perhaps most interestingly, the freedom bubble inaugurated by a set of minimal rules is
in fact what partly initiates circles, group movements and the like that at least for a
moment become choreographies. In conclusion, both the brief history of modern dance
and the KLT case imply that dance is modelled upon two opposite tensions –
improvisation and choreography. Consequently, as dance is seen here as the paradigm of
politics, the question of choreography versus improvisation shapes the praxis view in such
a way that any account on politics should be able to describe in what way the bipolar
tension is present in the chosen object of study.
In the next section, the focus is then on the last research question: If dance is the paradigm
of politics, what can it tell us about the current state of politics? I have chosen to inspect
one of the most conspicuous terrains in the field of conventional politics: elections and
the representative system in general.
7.2 Dance and representative democracy
By following the Arendtian view that still invests hopes in the agency of human beings
as well as taking into account Agamben’s and Nancy’s ‘inoperative politics’ (that is either
to come or presents itself, as it were, in its own absence) the figuration of a proper politics,
in contrast to improper, is rather hard to avoid. In other words, as a result of this theoretical
path one might have quite painlessly arrived at the conclusion that there is a ‘good’
politics and a ‘bad’ politics; an ‘authentic’ politics that finds it affirmation in contingency
61
(Agamben) or perhaps revelation (Nancy) at best, and a degenerated politics that is
virtually anything that is made. In this case, improvisation would be good politics and
choreography would be bad politics. To some degree this seems plausible on a very
general level – think of say North Korea, is it not an exemplary case of complete
choreography with a minimal degree of freedom? Or could not the Soviet system be
described as a utopian fantasy world precisely like the one found in the world of ballet?
But instead of concentrating on such apparent examples, I shall investigate a few
cornerstones of the liberal representative government. Furthermore, on the basis of the
conclusion in the previous chapter the choreography-improvisation paradigm cannot
simply be used to define whether the object of study represents either one or the other.
Instead, we should be able to describe the ways in which the two poles are manifest in the
case of the representative government as both are part and parcel of the same paradigm.
For theorists like Joseph Schumpeter and Giovanni Sartori, the repeatedly held elections
in liberal democracies should not be seen as a way of constituting a ‘rule by the people’.
Instead, both argued in their own ways that elections are but a momentary event where
parties and candidates compete for votes. These views have, perhaps on good grounds,
been deemed elitist. The aim here is however not to investigate the representative
government through its possible degree of real power of the people, but rather to view
Schumpeter’s idea of democracy simply as a description of it as an institutional
arrangement. If we look at the representative government with its election function as a
deliberately chosen system for state governance, precisely as Bernard Manin laid out in
his insightful work The Principles of Representative Government (1997), it can actually
be perceived as a relatively open structure which allows competition. The election
structure forms each time a similar frame within which the competition takes place. Like
in KLT, the frame is always formally the same, minimally restricted and in itself a
potential field of “new approaches” as one interviewee put it. But this does naturally not
mean, as already concluded in the previous chapter, that the frame is completely free of
differences in “leadership qualities” and previously learned techniques. If we again turn
back to the competition for votes, it is similarly not free of external forces of this kind;
candidates always differ in terms of election experience, economic resources, and media
attention – all those ingredients anyone living in a modern democracy is certainly familiar
with and conceive of as inherent parts of politics. But the underlying structure is an
arrangement that in principle allows new approaches. In conclusion, the paradigm of
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choreography and improvisation suggests, modelled on a similar form of argument as the
“elitist” view on democracy, that elections are not only connected to the question of
representation and the will of the people as such but to the question of to what extent the
potential freedom to create new approaches or to improvise is actualised.  There is nothing
in this system to safeguard the equality of people, “there’s space we’ll provide, will you
take it”, as one interviewee expressed, and in this sense it is of course not necessarily the
most morally correct institutional arrangement.
For Schumpeter then, as often cited elsewhere, democracy was a “political method”
(Schumpeter 1992 [1943], 242), its point was not to create social outcomes as such but
simply keep the system going. He also insisted on the fact that precisely because
democracy is a method, it cannot be thought in terms of an end in itself. In other words,
democracy understood as a system of elections was for Schumpeter a sphere of means
and as such one could not speak of an end in itself, precisely as Arendt stated that in fact
this is a paradox in terms because the ‘end’ is embedded in the activity itself. Somewhat
contra-intuitively and perhaps a bit ironically, the repetitive elections themselves form a
moment of pure means, although the means aspect has been primarily a project of critical
theory. If we are to speak of liberal democracies through the conceptual framework of
dance, the obvious conclusion is that the representative government as an institutional
arrangement is an exemplary case of structural improvisation, regardless of the specific
outcomes it produces or what the previous background of the participants is. The structure,
choreography, is the very arrangement of elections written down in every society that
calls itself a democracy, and within it any political move, improvisation, can in principal
occur. It might of course be remarked that this is nothing new to political research – the
“in principal” aspect of representative government is in short nothing but another version
of the laconic “best of the worst systems” view on democracy. But the important point
here is, as already outlined above, that the relevant question in the framework of a
representative system is perhaps not very often asked, which is the one concerning how
much space there is provided for improvisation. The representative government was not
designed to create equality and power of the people, it was designed to create a rational
way of government in the form of fair elections – this was Manin’s great contribution to
discussions on democracy in all its beautiful simplicity. He also showed how the use of
chance in elections was gradually simply neglected both in ancient Greece and in the
Italian city stated that still deployed it in the 16th and 17th centuries, and eventually lost
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its significance almost entirely in modern studies of representation where it is most often
seen as an interesting historical curiosity. Seen in this light, there can be no question of
the fact that the potentially open space that elections are the manifestation of has lost at
least one branch of its improvisational mode. What Cunningham brought back to dance
– that is, deliberately deployed chance – has been long forgotten in liberal democracies.
In this sense, one can only conclude that although there might be advances in today’s
democracies in terms of representation of the people’s will, there is a lot less momentum
for chance, unpredictability and improvisation. And yet, if we are to follow the line of
resonance in the work of Nancy and Agamben – and even John Cage for that matter – this
is precisely what the modern society ought to be cured from, its apparent disease of not
tolerating unpredictability.
Certain attention must be given to political parties in the context of elections. The analysis
of parties within the conceptual field of choreography and improvisation can entail at
least two different dimensions: the birth of political parties as such and their status as
players in the field of politics. If one thinks of the ‘new politics’ movement of the 1960’s
and 70’s in much part of the industrialised world, two tensions can easily be detected in
the case of the Green movement in Europe. In Finland for instance, as in many other
European countries, the key cleavage in the formation of green political parties in the late
1970’s was between the more environmentally radical “deep ecologists” (see Naess 1981
[1973]) and the more pragmatic civil society builders. The tension between choreography
and improvisation was in this way strikingly present in these new political movements of
the 1970’s, although this is of course but a fragmentary reflection of this fundamental
tension. Perhaps the more interesting aspect is that whatever the emphasis might be in
terms of the degree of party discipline and ideological premises, it seems that each time
a political movement arises and tries to form itself to the more concise form of a party, it
automatically forms a strictly formulated agenda and programme. Political parties,
relying on programmes and fully exhausted in ideology, are in this sense choreographies
par excellance. Their deliberate approaches are partly a result of the open structure itself
– the relatively open structure itself invites to the creation of choreographies and most
importantly perhaps, this effect is further amplified by the impossibility of restraining
from this chosen trajectory, unlike in the KLT concept where any chosen movement style
can be abandoned at any moment.
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If we again return to the question of representative government, bearing in mind that the
election system itself is a method of (possible) improvisation, the relevant question
concerning political parties is connected to their apparent impotence of restraining from
a particular agenda. We saw in the case of KLT that although it often happens that instead
of fully improvising participants draw from previously learned movement vocabularies
or choreographies, there is a freedom “not to choose anything at all” as formulated by one
participant. A traditional and somewhat plausible way of explaining why parties seem
incapable of following a rule of uncertainty of this kind is of course the idea that the main
point of democracy and elections is to represent different sections of people and thus
create equality, at least in the predominant understanding of modern democracy. If we
are to abandon or reformulate this and instead opt for possibilities of every once in a while
“profaning” (Agamben 2007) oneself from a particular agenda, the ethical aspect
concerning equality should perhaps be established in some other domain than politics.
This corresponds to some extent with one aspect of classical anarchism – Bakunin for
instance held that anarchism did not have problems with authorities in general; rather,
authorities were to be seen contextual and exchangeable and always open for
reformulation. In this sense anarchism as a principle of unfixed authorities is very close
to the idea of improvisation, although studying it in depth is outside the scope of this
study.
Another way of approaching the rigid choreographies of political parties is the one already
discussed in the context of so called elitist theories, namely the wish to win seats in
upcoming elections – private interests and career building aspects of such a kind would
then amount to the fact that few new approaches are tolerated inside the parties. This is
itself the main choreography within the party organisation and can without difficulty be
connected not only to representation of the people understood in ethical terms, but to the
modus operandi of the capitalist economy where everyone is part of the whole machinery
in one way or another. This in turn would lead us back to the field of critical
understandings of modern society. Agamben’s analysis of the latest stages of Western
societies is nothing but the affirmation of the fact that every form of life has been captured
by the workings of the biopolitical machinery. This would imply stretching beyond the
particular instances of elections or governments, those that Foucault (1992[1978], 92)
named “terminal forms” of power and instead focus on depicting alternative ways of
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seeing the political and digging up “marginal figures” such as Agamben’s exile (see
Agamben 2000).
In conclusion then, the dance paradigm offers at least two terrains of inspection when
used as a lens to approach the representative government. On one hand, if we see the
representative system as a structure of fair elections, we can describe Western
democracies as an example of structural improvisation. In political research, perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, this would correspond with a so called elitist view on democracy.
On the other hand, this potentially open space for new movements and approaches has
been to quite an extent invaded by career politicians, parties and pressure groups who all
have their strict choreographies and act accordingly. Theory wise, this points towards a
field of studies that focus on how this open space and life itself has become the object of
power in the West and why the overall choreography lies outside the specific context of
the representative government and elections. In Katulavatanssit, it seems to be possible
to establish a space where people can present their own choreographies without this
becoming the state of the art in general. In terms of liberal democracies, this seems to be
what political thought “has yet to establish” (Nancy 1992) and remains “to come”
(Agamben 1998). Like the purpose of writing music was for John Cage, the purpose of a
politics to come could perhaps be “an affirmation of life – not an attempt to bring order
out of chaos nor to suggest improvements in creation, but simply a way of waking up to
the very life we’re living, which is so excellent once one gets one’s mind and one’s desires
out of its way and lets it act of its own accord” (Cage 1957).
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Interview material:
Interviewee 1, male 34 years, main organiser of Katulavatanssit (March 29, 2016)
Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Interviewee 2, male 42 years, participant of Katulavatanssit (March 30, 2016),
Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Interviewee 3, female 28 years, participant of Katulavatanssit (March 30, 2016),
Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Interviewee 4, female 25 years, participant of Katulavatanssit (April 10, 2016),
Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Interviewee 5, female 24 years, participant of Katulavatanssit (April 14, 2016),
Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Interviewee 6, female 23 years, dance student at the Theatre Academy of Helsinki
(April 26, 2016), Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Interviewee 7, male 30 years, dancer (April 26, 2016), Interviewer: Katarina Sjöblom
Questionnaire material:
All material gathered, owned and managed by Lauri Jäntti (February–May 2015)
Respondent 1, female 37 years, archaeologist and researcher
Respondent 4, female 26 years, university student
Respondent 5, male 40 years, Ph.D. in Aerospace engineering
Respondent 6, female 27 years, Ph.D. student
Respondent 8, female 18 years, highs school student
Respondent 10, female 36 years, regional planning professional
Respondent 14, female 23 years, musician
Respondent 16, female 27 years, university student
